In People v. Palmer (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 440, the defendant was convicted by jury of two counts of continuous sexual abuse of a child involving two different children that occurred between 1994 and 1997. (Palmer, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 443.) A conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child under section 288.5 requires proof that the defendant has engaged in "three or more acts of substantial sexual conduct with a child under the age of 14 years . . . , as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 1203.066, or three or more acts of lewd or lascivious conduct, as defined in Section 288, . . . ." ( 288.5, subd. (a).) In Palmer, the prosecution pleaded and proved three or more acts of substantial sexual conduct and the appellate court concluded that "the jury convicted the defendant under the 'substantial sexual conduct' prong, instead of the 'lewd or lascivious' prong" of section 288.5. (Palmer, at p. 444.) Relying on jury instructions regarding the multiple victim special circumstance under subdivision (e)(7) of section 288.5, the Attorney General argued that when the jury made its multiple victim finding in Palmer, it implicitly convicted the defendant of violating section 288, thus triggering the One Strike law. (Palmer, at p. 444.) The court rejected that argument, because (1) "a true finding as to an enhancement is not a conviction of a substantive crime"; (2) the jury was never instructed on the elements of section 288 and it violates fundamental notions of due process to deem a defendant convicted of an offense on which the jury was never instructed; and (3) section 288 is not, a lesser included offense of section 288.5. With regard to the last point, the court stated that the "offenses involve different elements" and explained, " 'Section 288 requires the specific intent of "arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of the defendant or of the child. . . ." A conviction for section 288.5, in contrast, . . . requires no specific intent. . . . Because section 288.5 could be violated without necessarily also violating section 288, the latter is not necessarily included within the former. . . .' " (Palmer, at pp. 444-445.)