In People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, the defendant had pleaded guilty in 1993 to a sex offense requiring mandatory sex offender registration. (Picklesimer, at p. 336.) He moved to be removed from the sex offender registry in 2006. (Picklesimer, at p. 336.) The court held the defendant could seek relief only through a petition for a writ of mandate, not a "freestanding postjudgment motion ... ." (Id. at p. 335.) The defendant's motion could not be treated as such a writ petition because the record on appeal was inadequate to show he was entitled to relief. (Id. at p. 341.) Even if the court assumed the defendant was no longer subject to mandatory registration, he failed to show he was legally ineligible for discretionary sex offender registration. (Ibid.) In reaching that conclusion, the Picklesimer court rejected the defendant's Apprendi claim. He had contended "that the sex offender residency restrictions ... are punishment, and thus that the facts required to impose those restrictions--the facts supporting continued sex offender status--must now be found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury pursuant to Apprendi ... and its progeny ... ." (Picklesimer, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 344, ) The court stated: "Picklesimer cannot show a potential Apprendi violation on this basis. If Proposition 83's restrictions do not amount to punishment for his original crimes, there is no Apprendi problem and no right to a jury trial. Conversely, if Proposition 83's restrictions were to be considered punishment for his original offenses (but see In re E.J., supra, 47 Cal.4th 1258, 1271-1280 ...), they could not under the state and federal ex post facto clauses be constitutionally applied to Picklesimer, whose crimes all long predate the approval of Proposition 83. In either event, there is no constitutional bar to having a judge exercise his or her discretion to determine whether Picklesimer should continue to be subject to registration." (Picklesimer, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 344.)