People v. Renfro

In People v. Renfro (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 223, the defendant had entered into a plea agreement that conditioned his guilty plea on the prosecutor's promise that the offense could not be used as a qualifying offense in a future proceeding to commit the defendant as an MDSO. The Renfro court recognized that this type of proceeding was civil in nature rather than criminal and, like the SVPA, was intended to provide mental health treatment for offenders presently suffering from severe mental illness rather than to punish them for past offenses. (Renfro, at pp. 231-232.) But in light of the mandatory statutory parole scheme governing such proceedings, the court in Renfro refused to enforce a plea agreement that would effectively have nullified the statutory scheme. Rejecting the defendant's argument that the prosecution was estopped from not honoring the plea bargain, the court held: "The MDO provision of Renfro's plea agreement went beyond the sentencing court's authority. Specific performance of the plea agreement would undermine the MDO law and, in so doing, undermine public policy, public safety and the administration of justice by our courts. (People v. Renfro, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at pp. 232-233 "neither the prosecution nor the sentencing court has authority to impose a prison sentence without parole or to alter the applicable period of parole established by the Legislature and imposed by the Board of Prison Terms".) In affirming the judgment against the claim that due process required compliance with the plea agreement, the Renfro court was cognizant that an MDO proceeding is civil in nature and that the purpose of the MDO statute scheme is to provide mental health treatment for those offenders who are suffering from presently severe mental illness, not to punish them for their past offenses. (People v. Renfro, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at pp. 231-232.) The Renfro court nevertheless refused to enforce a plea agreement that would effectively "nullify a mandatory statutory parole scheme." (Id. at p. 230.) "Neither the prosecution nor the sentencing court has authority to impose a prison sentence without parole or to alter the applicable period of parole established by the Legislature and imposed by the Board of Prison Terms." (Id. at p. 232; see also id. at p. 233 "the MDO provision of Renfro's plea agreement went beyond the sentencing court's authority".)