People v. Russell (2006)

In People v. Russell (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1415, the defendant came across a motorcycle near trash cans behind a motorcycle repair shop. (Russell, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1421.) The Russell defendant took several affirmative steps to try to identify the owner, including inquiring within the motorcycle shop and going to the last recorded owner's address to have the motorcycle signed over to him. (Id. at p. 1422.) Furthermore, the motorcycle was not registered and, when the defendant was issued a traffic citation, the officer ran the plates and told the defendant it had not been reported stolen. (Ibid.) The court in Russell found that had the jury been instructed on mistake of fact--specifically, that an actual belief that the property was abandoned was enough to defeat the charge--it was reasonably probable that the defendant would have obtained a more favorable result. (Id. at p. 1433.) In Russell, the evidence that defendant believed the motorcycle had been abandoned was "relatively strong." (Russell, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1433.) The Court held that the trial court's failure to give sua sponte instructions on the defenses of claim of right and mistake of fact was state law error. (Russell, at p. 1431.) As the Court explained, "appellate review under People v. Watson (1956) 'focuses not on what a reasonable jury could do, but what such a jury is likely to have done in the absence of the error under consideration. In making that evaluation, an appellate court may consider, among other things, whether the evidence supporting the existing judgment is so relatively strong, and the evidence supporting a different outcome is so comparatively weak, that there is no reasonable probability the error of which the defendant complains affected the result.' 'There is a reasonable probability of a more favorable result within the meaning of Watson when there exists "at least such an equal balance of reasonable probabilities as to leave the court in serious doubt as to whether the error affected the result."' " (Russell, at p. 1432.) The Court of Appeal found the trial court prejudically erred by not instructing on mistake of fact based on "relatively strong" evidence that the defendant believed a motorcycle was in fact abandoned, and that he held the belief in good faith. (Id. at p. 1433.) This evidence included the poor condition of the motorcycle, the fact that the defendant found it parked near some trash bins by a repair shop (id. at p. 1421), and the defendant's testimony, corroborated by other witnesses, that he asked an employee of the shop if the motorcycle had been left for repair and was told that it was not. Before the owner reported the vehicle stolen, the defendant also had been stopped for a traffic violation, and he told the citing officer he found the motorcycle and intended to register it in his name. The citing officer ran the vehicle identification number to confirm that the vehicle had not been reported stolen and, at the defendant's request, gave defendant the name of the registered owner. Before he was arrested, the defendant made an attempt to find the registered owner in the hope he would sign the vehicle over. (Id. at pp. 1422-1423, 1433.) In light of the relative strength of the evidence that the defendant believed in good faith the motorcycle had been abandoned, the court concluded it was reasonably probable the result would have been different had the court instructed on mistake of fact. (Id. at p. 1433.) The Court of Appeal found the trial court prejudicially erred by not instructing on mistake of fact based on "relatively strong" evidence that the defendant believed a motorcycle was in fact abandoned, and that he held the belief in good faith. (People v. Russell, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1433.) This evidence included the poor condition of the motorcycle, the fact that the defendant found it parked near some trash bins by a repair shop (id. at p. 1421), and the defendant's testimony, corroborated by other witnesses, that he asked an employee of the shop if the motorcycle had been left for repair and was told that it was not. Before the owner reported the vehicle stolen, the defendant also had been stopped for a traffic violation, and he told the citing officer he found the motorcycle and intended to register it in his name. The citing officer ran the vehicle identification number to confirm that the vehicle had not been reported stolen and, at the defendant's request, gave defendant the name of the registered owner. Before he was arrested, the defendant made an attempt to find the registered owner in the hope he would sign the vehicle over. (Id. at pp. 1422-1423, 1433.) In light of the relative strength of the evidence that the defendant believed in good faith the motorcycle had been abandoned, the court concluded it was reasonably probable the result would have been different had the court instructed on mistake of fact. (Id. at p. 1433.)