In People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, the defendant was in a car when he shot at a rival gang member, Gonzalez, who returned fire. A bullet hit and killed an innocent bystander. The defendant and Gonzalez were both charged with murder and it was specially alleged, as to the defendant, that the murder was committed by discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle ( 187, 12022.55). The prosecution proceeded on two theories: as to both the defendant and Gonzalez, premeditated first degree murder; in addition, as to the defendant, first degree murder perpetrated by means of intentionally discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle with the specific intent to inflict death, pursuant to section 189. ( People v. Sanchez, supra, at p. 838.) The issue in Sanchez, which is not at issue here, was one of concurrent causation or transferred intent in a single-fatal-bullet case. ( Id. at p. 839.) However, one of the court's statements is helpful to our analysis. The California Supreme Court stated, "Although in this case it could not be determined who was the direct or actual shooter of the single fatal round, the evidence, with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the guilty verdicts, supports a finding that defendant's commission of life-threatening deadly acts in connection with his attempt on Gonzalez's life was a substantial concurrent, and hence proximate, cause of the victim's death. All that remained to be proved was defendant's culpable mens rea (premeditation and malice) in order to support his conviction of premeditated first degree murder. Even without a showing of premeditation, if defendant was shown to have intentionally discharged his firearm from a motor vehicle with the specific intent to inflict death, then his crime was murder in the first degree by operation of section 189." Sanchez, (26 Cal.4th at pp. 848-849, ) The California Supreme Court in Sanchez further discussed the drive-by shooting clause of section 189 in several footnotes. At one point, the court stated, "In defendant's case, the question of premeditation aside, if he was found to have intentionally discharged a firearm from a motor vehicle with the specific intent to inflict death, then by operation of section 189, such circumstance afforded a separate basis for the first degree murder conviction." ( People v. Sanchez, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 851, fn. 10.) At another point, the court stated, "As we have noted, under the provisions of section 189, on which the jury was also instructed, defendant need not have been found to have acted with premeditation in order to be held liable for first degree murder on a finding that he intentionally discharged his firearm from a motor vehicle with the intent to inflict death." ( Id. at p. 853, fn. 11.)