In People v. Stringham (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 184, the defendant who had been convicted after a jury trial in Del Norte County argued that his conviction should be reversed because, prior to trial: (1) he had entered into a plea agreement with the prosecution under which he would plead guilty to a lesser charge; (2) that plea agreement was "conditionally" accepted by the-then trial judge who later recused himself, with the result that; (3) the case was transferred to a different judge who, after learning more about the case and hearing from members of the victim's family, rejected the plea agreement. Justice Poche rejected the defendant's arguments that the acceptance of the original plea agreement should stand and that the second trial judge could not withdraw that acceptance. He wrote: "We start with the basic proposition that 'judicial approval is an essential condition precedent to any plea bargain worked out by the defense and the prosecution.' The parties' negotiated disposition is ineffective unless and until it is approved by the court. This principle is recognized in numerous statutes (e.g., 1192.1, 1192.2, 1192.4), the most important of which is section 1192.5. The court's approval of a proposed plea bargain must necessarily be an informed decision. The court can be expected to consult the probation report that will almost always be prepared. In felony cases, the court may (as did the second judge) examine the transcript of the defendant's preliminary examination. Diagnostic reports received pursuant to section 1203.03, statements in aggravation and mitigation, and victim statements (see 1170, subd. (b)) may also be considered. Information from these and other sources is available to a court pondering whether to withdraw its approval of a negotiated disposition. It cannot be assumed that no attention will be paid to them by the court. The potential for reflection and a change of the judicial position is obvious and statutorily sanctioned. 'Implicit in the language of section 1192.5 is the premise that the court, upon sentencing, has broad discretion to withdraw its prior approval of a negotiated plea.' That statute 'provides that the court's approval of a plea bargain is not binding on the court and that approval may be withdrawn at the time of sentencing if the court, after further consideration and in the exercise of its inherent discretion in sentencing, concludes that the bargain is not in the best interests of society' or 'upon the court being more fully informed about the case.' A change of the court's mind is thus always a possibility." (Stringham at p. 194.)