In People v. Superior Court (Ghilotti) (2002) 27 Cal.4th 888, an issue before the Supreme Court was whether under section 6601, subdivision (d), "evaluators may consider, as a factor reducing the likelihood of reoffense, the chances that a person who is substantially dangerous if untreated will voluntarily accept community treatment to ameliorate the substantial danger." (Id. at p. 925.) The Supreme Court observed that "section 6601, subdivision (d), like the SVPA in general, asks the broader question whether, as the result of a diagnosed mental disorder, the person presents a substantial danger of reoffense if released without conditions, or whether instead he is safe only if restrained, supervised, and treated involuntarily under the Director's custody." (Id. at pp. 926-927.) The court in Ghilotti determined that "insofar as the protocol permits, the evaluators may consider any factor which, in their professional judgment, is relevant to the ultimate issue whether the person is a substantial danger to reoffend if free in the community without any conditions, supervision, monitoring, or mandatory treatment in the Director's custody." (Id. at p. 927.) Thus, one factor might be whether "there is practicable treatment, readily available in the community, which would eliminate or control the impulses, and the person's current mental condition is such that he or she can be, and is, willing and able to pursue such treatment as long as it is needed." (Ibid.) "Common sense suggests that the pertinent factors should include: (1) the availability, effectiveness, safety, and practicality of community treatment for the particular disorder the person harbors; (2) whether the person's mental disorder leaves him or her with volitional power to pursue such treatment voluntarily; (3) the intended and collateral effects of such treatment, and the influence of such effects on a reasonable expectation that one would voluntarily pursue it; (4) the person's progress, if any, in any mandatory SVPA treatment program he or she has already undergone; (5) the person's expressed intent, if any, to seek out and submit to any necessary treatment, whatever its effects; (6) any other indicia bearing on the credibility and sincerity of such an expression of intent." (Id. at p. 929.) The question is whether the person is "prepared to control his untreated dangerousness by voluntary means if released unconditionally to the community." (Ibid.) The evaluations performed under section 6601, subdivisions (c) through (f) did not produce the concurrence of two designated evaluators under section 6601, subdivision (d), or of two independent professionals under section 6601, subdivisions (e) and (f), that the defendant met the criteria for commitment. (Ghilotti, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 905.) Notwithstanding the lack of concurring evaluations, the district attorney, at the request of the DMH director, filed a petition for recommitment. (Id. at pp. 893-894.) The trial court dismissed the petition, and the Court of Appeal denied a petition for writ of mandamus to vacate that dismissal order. (Id. at pp. 899-900.) The Supreme Court concluded an SVPA commitment or recommitment petition cannot be filed unless two mental health professionals agree the person qualifies as an SVP. (Ghilotti, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 894.) The court analyzed all the subdivisions of section 6601 together and concluded, "the clear import of this scheme" is the DMH's determination whether to request the filing of a commitment petition is governed by the evaluation procedures. (Ghilotti, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 906.) If the two designated mental health professionals do not agree the person meets the criteria for commitment, and the two independent professionals also do not agree the person meets the criteria for commitment, then "the DMH Director may not request the filing of a petition," and the district attorney may not file one. (Id. at pp. 907, 909.) In Ghilotti, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court may review an evaluator's assessment for legal error and, if the court finds material legal error on the face of the report, must direct "that the erring evaluator prepare a new or corrected report applying correct legal standards." (Ghilotti, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 895.) Consistent with that conclusion, the Supreme Court remanded the matter to the Court of Appeal with directions to issue a writ of mandamus vacating the trial court's order dismissing the recommitment petition and to remand the matter to the trial court. (Ibid.) On remand, the trial court was to review the designated evaluators' reports for material legal error and, if necessary, direct the evaluators to prepare new or corrected reports under the correct standard. (Id. at pp. 895, 929.)