In Peterson v. John Crane, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 498, a widow asserted that her husband's lung cancer and asbestosis were asbestos related and pursued causes of action against the defendant "in her capacities as an individual (loss of consortium claim), as successor in interest to her husband's claims (survivor tort claims), and as her husband's legal heir (wrongful death claims.)" (Peterson v. John Crane, Inc., supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at pp. 502, 506.) The defendant extended a single section 998 offer to the plaintiff. (Id. at p. 502.) After the jury returned a verdict in the defendant's favor, the defendant filed a memorandum of costs, seeking, among other things, expert witness fees. (Id. at p. 503.) The trial court awarded the defendant its costs, including nearly $ 50,000 in expert witness fees. (Id. at p. 504.) The plaintiff appealed, arguing "there were actually three plaintiffs in the case because she sued in three different capacities," thus, the defendant's single offer, which was addressed to the plaintiff in all three of her capacities, was invalid. (Id. at p. 505.) The court of appeal affirmed, finding "there was only one offeree plaintiff for purposes of section 998." (Id. at p. 507.) In doing so, the court noted: "Section 998 provides that 'any party may serve an offer . . . upon any other party to the action' to allow judgment in accord with the statute.' (Peterson v. John Crane, Inc., supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 506.) In determining the meaning of the statute, the court observed: "The relevant plain and commonsense meaning of the word 'party' is 'an individual concerned in a proceeding' such as 'a person who is concerned in an action or affair.' A 'party,' therefore, is a person--not a cause of action, primary right, or legal capacity, but a person." (Id. at p. 507.) The court further explained that "at the core of the rules pertaining to section 998 offers to multiple plaintiffs is the concern that the multiple parties will not be able to agree whether to accept the offer and, as a result, the chance for the settlement of at least some of the claims in a case will be lost. That concern does not arise where the offeree is a single individual, prosecuting claims on her own behalf (as opposed to a representative capacity), who is faced with no greater internal mental debate than any individual plaintiff who must decide whether to settle all of her causes of action." (Id. at p. 510.) In Peterson v. John Crane, Inc., the court rejected Widow Peterson's contention that her three capacities (individual loss of consortium claimant/survivor tort claimant/wrongful death heirship claims) required three separate offers. Although Mrs. Peterson had standing to assert different types of claims, they were all made on her own behalf, and they all arose out of the same injury (her late husband's asbestosis). She remained the same individual party, and she properly represented only one offeree plaintiff for purposes of section 998, such that one offer to her was permitted. (Id. at pp. 505-507.) In short, a widow sued the defendant individually, as her deceased husband's successor in interest, and as her deceased husband's legal heir, seeking to recover for her husband's alleged asbestos-related disease. (Peterson, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 501.) The Peterson court concluded there was only one plaintiff, despite the multiple roles she occupied in the litigation. (Id. at pp. 506-507.) The Peterson court noted that the offer did not need to be apportioned because the proposed settlement sum was zero and proposed a mutual waiver of costs. (Id. at p. 510, fn. 11.) Additionally, any finding regarding the liability of the defendant would resolve all claims regardless of what "hat" the plaintiff wore. Thus, there was no difficultly in determining which party obtained the more favorable result at trial.