In Pollack v. Lytle (1981) 120 Cal. App. 3d 931, 175 Cal. Rptr. 81, the court permitted a suit for indemnity between lawyers who had represented the client at the same time in the same matter. Law Firm I arranged for Law Firm II to act as trial counsel, but Law Firm II did not properly prepare the case for trial. Unaware of Law Firm II's failure to properly prepare the case, Law Firm I and the client rejected a lucrative pretrial settlement offer. Law Firm II took the case to trial, lost, and induced the client to sue Law Firm I for malpractice. Law Firm I cross-complained for indemnity against Law Firm II, and the trial court sustained Law Firm II's demurrer without leave to amend. The Court of Appeal reversed. It recognized the general rule holding a successor law firm owes no duty to its predecessor, but held the public policy considerations underlying the rule did not apply in the case of associate counsel working concurrently. It concluded under agency principles, the associate law firm owes the principal law firm the same duties it owes the client, and "Accordingly, public policy considerations do not mandate that an associate remain free from liability for a breach of the duty owed to its principal." (Pollack, supra, 120 Cal. App. 3d at pp. 942-943). The court considered an attorney's duty to concurrent counsel. There, the plaintiff attorney (Pollack) represented his client in a medical malpractice lawsuit on a contingency fee basis. The plaintiff associated the defendant attorney, Lytle, as trial counsel, relying upon Lytle's false representations that he would obtain a qualified neurosurgeon to testify in the action in exchange for one-third of Pollack's contingent fee. ( Id. at p. 936.) Lytle did not properly prepare the case for trial. Unaware of this, Pollack and the client rejected a $ 250,000 pretrial settlement offer. Due to Lytle's conduct of the trial, the jury returned a defense verdict in the medical malpractice action. Lytle then induced the client to sue Pollack for legal malpractice. Pollack sued Lytle for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, breach of contract, legal malpractice, and declaratory relief. The Court of Appeal, over a strong dissent, reversed the trial court's sustaining of a demurrer. The Court of Appeal held that Pollack could maintain a suit for indemnity against Lytle, concluding that simple agency principles governed the relationship of associate counsel in the circumstances presented. ( Id. at pp. 940-943.) Acknowledging the "growing body of law which holds, as a matter of public policy, that a successor attorney owes no duty to his predecessor" ( id. at p. 942), the majority found the policy rationale of those cases inapplicable to the role of associate counsel. "The roles of successor and associate attorneys are decidedly different. In the fulfillment of his duty of undivided loyalty to the client, a successor attorney must view the client's situation as of the moment when he is engaged. Hence public policy requires that he not be subjected to any possible conflict of interest which may deter him from determining the best interests of the client by the possibility that he may be held liable for his acts by his predecessor. In contrast, an associate attorney acting as the agent of the principal attorney replaces no one, but acts at the behest of his principal. "Admittedly, he remains bound to act in the best interests of the client, but this creates no unavoidable conflict. Should he find that the principal attorney's actions to date pose a potential danger to the client's best interests, the agent-associate is dutybound to make the fullest disclosure of these material facts to the principal attorney . . . . Should the principal attorney choose to ignore the client's interests, the agent-associate remains free to terminate the agency relationship and withdraw as associate counsel. Furthermore, the associate attorney's duty to exercise reasonable professional care, skill and diligence on behalf of the client is precisely equivalent to the duty he owes his principal in dealing with the subject matter of the agency. Accordingly, public policy considerations do not mandate that an associate remain free from liability for a breach of the duty owed to his principal." ( Id. at pp. 942-943.) The Pollack court reasoned that "holding that an associate attorney owes no duty to anyone but the client would create the potential for a battle of wills over promotion of the client's interests, a situation which could well rebound to the client's detriment, for the determination of a client's best interests is at best a subjective value judgment upon which reasonable minds could differ. Moreover, in view of the principal attorney's liability for the acts of subordinate counsel under the doctrine of respondeat superior, it would be manifestly unfair to relieve an agent-associate of accountability to his principal. An application of agency principles to the relationship of an associate attorney with the principal attorney would entitle plaintiff to indemnification from defendant as to liability resulting from his tortious conduct. The right to indemnity is implied from the relationship of the parties. Absent the public policy considerations found in the relationship of predecessor-successor attorneys, there is no reason to deny a principal attorney the benefit of indemnity." ( Id. at p. 943.) In sum, although the majority agreed that prior decisions precluded an implied duty to successor counsel for policy reasons, it concluded that the duty owed by associated counsel arose from the specific express agency relationship created by contract. Consequently, the claim of a breach of fiduciary duty could be supported by a duty arising from the agency relationship. (See 1 Mallen & Smith, Legal Malpractice (5th ed. 2000) 5.9, pp. 541-542.) In dissent, Justice Johnson warned that recognizing a duty between cocounsel would create unavoidable conflicts. ( Pollack, supra, 120 Cal. App. 3d at p. 948, 175 Cal. Rptr. 81 (dis. opn. of Johnson, J.).) "In terms of . . . public policy rationale, I see no logical distinction that should be based on litigants' status as cocounsel as opposed to successor counsel . . . ." ( Id. at p. 947 (dis. opn. of Johnson, J.).) "Regardless of context, the underlying rationale . . .,that the possibility of a cause of action for indemnity in legal malpractice cases, whether sought against a predecessor or successor attorney, would create such potentially burdensome conflicts of interest for an attorney representing a client, public policy dictates that such a cause of action should be barred." ( Id. at p. 948 (dis. opn. of Johnson, J.).) "The potential for conflict is manifest. By recognizing a fiduciary duty between cocounsel the exposure of attorneys to liability is increased, thus placing them in an untenable position of divided loyalties to their clients and associated counsel." ( Id. at p. 949 (dis. opn. of Johnson, J.).) Nonrecognition of a duty to cocounsel "may seem to impose a harsh burden on a wronged attorney. However, in balancing the interests of attorneys in protecting their fees and the public policy of protecting clients' rights to receive the undivided loyalty of all counsel who represent them, the wiser course is to reject the recognition of a fiduciary duty between cocounsel." ( Id. at p. 949 (dis. opn. of Johnson, J.).)