In Raab v. Casper (1975) 51 Cal. App. 3d 866, the defendant built approximately one-third of his home--part of his driveway, various utility lines, and part of his yard and landscaping--on plaintiff's land. The trial court granted the defendant a prescriptive easement for the driveway and utility lines, along with " 'an easement for the maintenance of lawn, fences, shrubs, fruit trees, and landscaping around defendant's house . . . .' " ( Raab, supra, 51 Cal. App. 3d at p. 877.) Noting the differences between an easement and ownership, the appellate court stated that "an exclusive interest labeled 'easement' may be so comprehensive as to supply the equivalent of an estate, i.e., ownership. In determining whether a conveyance creates an easement or estate, it is important to observe the extent to which the conveyance limits the uses available to the grantor; an estate entitles the owner to the exclusive occupation of a portion of the earth's surface." ( Id. at p. 876.) Citing to a real property treatise, the court used as an example a conveyance purporting to transfer unlimited use or enjoyment of property, which would amount to an ownership interest. ( Id. at pp. 876-877.) Noting that the trial court had phrased its judgment in terms of an "easement," the appellate court nonetheless had no doubt that the "easement" was intended to give defendant unlimited use of the yard. Defendant himself did not intend to allow plaintiffs to have access to the yard. The judgment was designed to exclude plaintiffs and create the practical equivalent of an estate. ( Raab, supra, 51 Cal. App. 3d at p. 877.) Therefore, to create such an interest, the appellate court held that defendant needed to prove he owned the land by adverse possession. ( Id. at pp. 877-878.) In Raab v. Casper (1975) the Caspers built their family home encroaching on the Raabs' property, placing part of their driveway, utility lines, and landscaping on the Raabs' property. The Court reversed the trial court's ruling that had granted the Caspers a prescriptive easement over the Raabs' land for their driveway and utility lines, and "'for the maintenance of lawn, fences, shrubs, fruit trees, and landscaping around the CASPER house . . . .'" In so ruling, we observed: "Although adroitly phrased to avoid the language of a grant of title, the above-quoted portion of the judgment was undoubtedly designed to give the Caspers unlimited use of the yard around their home. The Caspers doubtless did not intend the Raabs, owners of the nominal servient tenement, to picnic, camp or dig a well in their yard. The Caspers doubtless did not intend to own a house on one side of the boundary with an unmarketable yard on the other. The findings and judgment were designed to exclude the Raabs from the Caspers' domestic establishment, employing the nomenclature of easement but designed to create the practical equivalent of an estate. Achievement of that objective required proof and findings of the elements of adverse possession, not prescriptive use." (51 Cal.App.3d at p. 877.)