The right to a setoff is not absolute and may be restricted when the failure to do so would be inequitable. (Advance Industrial Finance Co. v. Western Equities, Inc. (1959) 173 Cal. App. 2d 420, 426-427 [343 P.2d 408] [a claim held by assignment does not as a matter of law give rise to setoff rights, and the assignee's right to an offset may be denied in certain instances]; Barnhill v. Robert Saunders & Co. (1981) 125 Cal. App. 3d 1, 4-5 [177 Cal. Rptr. 803]; Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bank of America (9th Cir. 1983) 701 F.2d 831, 836-837; see also Harrison v. Adams (1942) 20 Cal. 2d 646, 650 [128 P.2d 9] [in determining whether to allow the equitable right of setoff, a court will consider the positions of the real parties in interest].) It follows that the trial court's decision was one subject to an exercise of its equitable powers, and that the only issue before us on this appeal is whether that discretion was so abused that it resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. (In re Marriage of Doud (1986) 181 Cal. App. 3d 510, 525 [226 Cal. Rptr. 423]; Dolan v. Buena Engineers, Inc. (1994) 24 Cal. App. 4th 1500, 1504 [29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 903]; see also Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal. 3d 557, 566 [86 Cal. Rptr. 65, 468 P.2d 193].)