In Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 10, the tenant had known of the defect in her apartment for two weeks before the injury and had actually notified the manager of the building of the hazard. That hazard was a cracked handle of a lavatory faucet, and nothing was done to repair the faucet; although clearly the manager could have made the repair. The tenant, as occupant, also was in a position at least to warn her social guests of the hazard which existed with reference to the faucet handle. The plaintiff was a social guest on the premises of defendant's lessee's apartment when his hand was injured on a defective faucet which defendant was aware of but failed to repair and failed to warn plaintiff about. Civil Code section 1714 provides: "Everyone is responsible not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has willfully or by want of ordinary care brought the injury upon himself. . ." The Court made it clear that only the common law rules of immunity were under consideration. It said that "continued adherence to the common law distinctions can only lead to injustice or, if we are to avoid injustice, further fictions with the resulting complexity and confusion." (69 Cal.2d at p. 119.) The California Supreme court stated "a departure from this fundamental principle involves the balancing of a number of considerations; the major ones are the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved." The court in Rowland v. Christian set forth the factors to be balanced in determining the existence of a duty of care under the circumstances. "The major ones are the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved." (69 Cal.2d at p. 113.) Although the Court rejected the "rigid classification " of a plaintiff's status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee as "determinative," the plaintiff's status bears on the question of liability because "the proper test to be applied to the liability of a possessor of land in accordance with section 1714 of the Civil Code is whether in the management of his property he has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others." (Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 119.) The Court set forth the factual bases for finding a duty, and noted that analysis requires a balancing of a number of considerations; the major ones are the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. (Id. at pp. 112-113.)