In Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc. (1998) 18 Cal. 4th 200, two plaintiffs, a mother and son, had sued the defendants for videotaping and broadcasting a documentary program showing the plaintiffs' rescue from an automobile accident and their transportation to the hospital in a medical helicopter. The California Supreme Court reviewed a summary judgment motion brought by the media defendants. Regarding the concept of newsworthiness, the Shulman court said the courts must accord great deference to editorial decisionmaking in matters involving legitimate public interest but that newsworthiness can be limited in the proper circumstances: "An analysis measuring newsworthiness of facts about an otherwise private person involuntarily involved in an event of public interest by their relevance to a newsworthy subject matter incorporates considerable deference to reporters and editors, avoiding the likelihood of unconstitutional interference with the freedom of the press to report truthfully on matters of legitimate public interest. In general, it is not for a court or jury to say how a particular story is best covered. The constitutional privilege to publish truthful material 'ceases to operate only when an editor abuses his broad discretion to publish matters that are of legitimate public interest.' By confining our interference to extreme cases, the courts 'avoid unduly limiting . . . the exercise of effective editorial judgment.'" Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., supra, 18 Cal. 4th at pages 224-225. "On the other hand, no mode of analyzing newsworthiness can be applied mechanically or without consideration of its proper boundaries. To observe that the newsworthiness of private facts about a person involuntarily thrust into the public eye depends, in the ordinary case, on the existence of a logical nexus between the newsworthy event or activity and the facts revealed is not to deny that the balance of free press and privacy interests may require a different conclusion when the intrusiveness of the revelation is greatly disproportionate to its relevance. Intensely personal or intimate revelations might not, in a given case, be considered newsworthy, especially where they bear only slight relevance to a topic of legitimate public concern." Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., supra, 18 Cal. 4th at page 226. In Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc. (1998) the court discussed the expectation of privacy of accident victims who had sued television producers under common law tort doctrine for publication of private facts and intrusion. The nurse in charge of a helicopter-based medical team wore a remote microphone on her clothing, allowing her ongoing conversation with one of the victims to be heard during the victim's rescue from an overturned car and her subsequent transfer to a hospital in the helicopter. Reversing summary judgment, the court found "triable issues exist as to whether defendants tortiously intruded by listening to the victim's confidential conversations with Nurse Carnahan at the rescue scene without the victim's consent." ( Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 213.) Pointing to the Privacy Act as possible support for the conclusion that the victim had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her conversations with the nurse, the court quoted from its opinion in Ribas: "'While one who imparts private information risks the betrayal of his confidence by the other party, a substantial distinction has been recognized between the secondhand repetition of the contents of a conversation and its simultaneous dissemination to an unannounced second auditor, whether that auditor be a person or a mechanical device. . . . Such secret monitoring denies the speaker an important aspect of privacy of communication - the right to control the nature and extent of the firsthand dissemination of his statements.' (Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 234-235.) In Shulman v. Group W. Productions, Inc. (1998) 18 Cal. 4th at pages 230-231, the lead opinion explained the intrusion tort as follows: "Of the four privacy torts . . ., the tort of intrusion into private places, conversations or matter is perhaps the one that best captures the common understanding of an 'invasion of privacy.' It encompasses unconsented-to physical intrusion into the home, hospital room or other place the privacy of which is legally recognized, . . . It is in the intrusion cases that invasion of privacy is most clearly seen as an affront to individual dignity. 'A measure of personal isolation and personal control over the conditions of its abandonment is of the very essence of personal freedom and dignity, is part of what our culture means by these concepts. A man whose home may be entered at the will of another, whose conversations may be overheard at the will of another, whose marital and familial intimacies may be overseen at the will of another, is less of a man, has less human dignity, on that account. He who may intrude upon another at will is the master of the other and, in fact, intrusion is a primary weapon of the tyrant.'" (Ibid.)