In Smith, Smith & Kring v. Superior Court (Oliver) (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 573, the plaintiff sued her former attorneys, SS&K, for legal malpractice among other claims, asserting SS&K misled her into agreeing to settle for too little money in a personal injury lawsuit arising from an automobile accident. SS&K hired the attorneys that had represented the defendant in the plaintiff's personal injury action, HB&B, to defend it in the legal malpractice case. The plaintiff then moved to disqualify HB&B, which motion was granted. The Court of Appeal reversed. (Smith, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.) In so doing, the Smith court reviewed former rule 2-111(A)(4), including an amendment to that rule that was made in response to our Supreme Court's decision in Comden v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 906, 915-916, which applied an earlier version of rule 2-111(A)(4) to uphold a trial court's decision to recuse an attorney solely on the basis that the attorney was a potential trial witness. The Smith court noted that after former rule 2-111(A)(4) was amended (see fn. 7, ante), a "'trial court, when balancing the several competing interests, should resolve the close case in favor of the client's right to representation by an attorney of his or her choice and not as in Comden v. Superior Court, in favor of complete withdrawal of the attorney. Under the present rule i.e., amended former rule 2-111(A)(4), if a party is willing to accept less effective counsel because of the attorney's testifying, neither his opponent nor the trial court should be able to deny this choice to the party without a convincing demonstration of detriment to the opponent or injury to the integrity of the judicial process.' " (Smith, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 579.) Because HB&B obtained written consent from SS&K, the Smith court reviewed the evidence proffered by the plaintiff to determine whether she satisfied her burden to show a "'convincing demonstration of detriment.'" (Smith, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 579.) After balancing the several competing interests in ruling on such a motion, the Smith court concluded that the plaintiff had not met her burden. (Id. at pp. 580-582.) With regard to the balancing of competing interests, the Smith court noted a court should "start with the proposition that 'the right of a party to be represented in litigation by the attorney of his or her choice is a significant right'" and noted that rule 5-210 "'permited HB&B to act as both advocate and witness since the firm obtained SS&K's consent and 'the fact that the client has consented to the dual capacity must be given great weight.'" (Smith, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 580.) The court then looked at a variety of factors: "First, the court must consider the combined effects of the strong interest parties have in representation by counsel of their choice, and in avoiding the duplicate expense and time-consuming effort involved in replacing counsel already familiar with the case. 'It must be kept in mind that disqualification usually imposes a substantial hardship on the disqualified attorney's innocent client, who must bear the monetary and other costs of finding a replacement.' "Second, the court must consider the possibility counsel is using the motion to disqualify for purely tactical reasons. Should counsel freely be able to disqualify opposing counsel simply by calling them as witnesses, it would 'pose the very threat to the integrity of the judicial process that motions to disqualify purport to prevent.' '"After all, in cases that do not involve past representation conflict cases the attempt by an opposing party to disqualify the other side's lawyer must be viewed as part of the tactics of an adversary proceeding."' "Finally, '"Whenever an adversary declares his intent to call opposing counsel as a witness, prior to ordering disqualification of counsel, the court should determine whether counsel's testimony is, in fact, genuinely needed."' In determining the necessity of counsel's testimony, the court should consider 'the significance of the matters to which he or she might testify, the weight his or her testimony might have in resolving such matters, and the availability of other witnesses or documentary evidence by which these matters may be independently established.' The court should also consider whether it is the trial attorney or another member of his or her firm who will be the witness." (Smith, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at pp. 580-581.)