When the Legislature has employed the same word or term more than once in a statute, there is a general presumption that the word or term means the same thing each time it is used. (People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal. 3d 441, 468 [194 Cal. Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697]; Braun v. Bureau of State Audits (1998) 67 Cal. App. 4th 1382, 1389 [79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 791].) On the other hand, the same term used in different statutes may have a variety of meanings, and context is of paramount importance. (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 8 Cal. 4th 704, 716.) In construing a statute, however, the primary goal is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature. ( Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal. 4th 1232, 1245 [82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 85, 970 P.2d 872].) Even plain language in a statute will not be slavishly given its apparent effect if to do so would frustrate the legislative intent, ascertained from a review of the entire statutory scheme. (Calatayud v. State of California (1998) 18 Cal. 4th 1057, 1064-1065 [77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 202, 959 P.2d 360].) Finally, when a statute is susceptible of two constructions, that one which would raise serious constitutional issues should be avoided. ( F & L Farm Co. v. City Council (1998) 65 Cal. App. 4th 1345, 1353 [77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 360].)