Technical Defect In Notice of Entry of Judgment

It is established law that a technical defect in the notice of entry of judgment cannot be invoked to avoid the rule 2(a) 60-day period for filing a notice of appeal, unless the defect was arguably so egregious as effectively to preclude any actual notice of entry of judgment. (Delmonico v. Laidlaw Waste Systems, Inc. (1992) 5 Cal. App. 4th 81, 85-86 [6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 599]; National Advertising Co. v. City of Rohnert Park (1984) 160 Cal. App. 3d 614, 618-619 [206 Cal. Rptr. 696]; Pacific City Bank v. Los Caballeros Racquet & Sports Club, Ltd. (1983) 148 Cal. App. 3d 223, 228 [195 Cal. Rptr. 776]; Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs). "It is well-established that no particular form is required to give notice to a party that judgment has been entered. Even though the notice here incorrectly stated the date on which the judgment was entered, the information contained in that notice satisfied the rule telling [appellant] that the judgment had been entered. Because it is the notice that triggers the appeal period and not the date the judgment was entered, there is no rational way that the inaccuracy could have misled [appellant]. In light of the language and purpose of the rule, the date on which the judgment is entered is surplusage when notice is given by using the document entitled 'notice of entry of judgment.' Accordingly, there is no principled basis on which we can avoid the application of rule 2(a)(2)'s 60-day period." ( Delmonico v. Laidlaw Waste Systems, Inc., supra, 5 Cal. App. 4th at pp. 85-86.)