The "Remers-Harvey-Madden" or " Harvey-Madden" rule is based on the holdings in Remers v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 659, , People v. Harvey (1958) 156 Cal. App. 2d 516, and People v. Madden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1017. These three cases established the "collective knowledge" evidentiary rule governing proof of the underlying grounds for an arrest or detention when the authority to arrest or detain has been transmitted to the arresting officer through official police channels. The "Harvey-Madden" rule governs the manner in which the prosecution may prove the underlying grounds for arrest when the authority to arrest has been transmitted to the arresting officer through police channels. In People v. Gomez (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 531, the court explained "it is well settled under California law that an officer may arrest an individual on the basis of information and probable cause supplied by another officer. 'However, . . . when the first officer passes off information through "official channels" that leads to arrest, the officer must also show basis for his probable cause. In other words, the so-called "Harvey-Madden" rule requires the basis for the first officer's probable cause must be "something other than the imagination of an officer who does not become a witness." ' Probable cause for a search or an arrest without a warrant may be proven by information passed from one officer to another if it is shown the information was ' " 'factual rather than conclusionary,' related 'specific and articulable facts,' was the product of personal observations by the informing officer, and was reliable." ' Ultimately, the issue boils down to whether the latter officer's reliance on the information was reasonable." (People v. Gomez, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 540.) In In re Eskiel S. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1638, the arresting officer testified to having heard a radio broadcast reporting "a possible gang fight involving 10 to 12 Black persons including 1 possibly armed with a rifle . . . ." (Id. at p. 1641.) The arresting officer had no basis for detaining the juvenile besides the information he had heard in the radio report. (Id. at p. 1642.) The Court concluded that the trial court erred by overruling the juvenile's Remers-Harvey-Madden objection to the radio report in the suppression hearing. (Id. at pp. 1642-1644.) The Court noted that "the record was void of any evidence of the source of the information contained in the radio broadcast." (Id. at p. 1644.) Accordingly, the Court observed that since "a radio broadcast which cannot be traced back to its source amounts to nothing more than an anonymous tip" (ibid.), testimony of the arresting officer concerning the substance of the broadcast should have been excluded.