In People v. Williams (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779, the California Supreme Court reexamined the mental state for assault and clarified that "assault requires actual knowledge of the facts sufficient to establish that the defendant's act by its nature will probably and directly result in injury to another." (Id. at p. 782.) In turn, the court specifically held that "assault does not require a specific intent to cause injury or a subjective awareness of the risk that an injury might occur. Rather, assault only requires an intentional act and actual knowledge of those facts sufficient to establish that the act by its nature will probably and directly result in the application of physical force against another." ( Id. at p. 790.) The Williams court went on to find the jury instruction at issue, which mirrored the instruction given in the instant case, to be "potentially ambiguous." ( Williams, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 790.) It reasoned as follows: "Because 'the test of natural and probable consequences is an objective one' citation, merely requiring the jury to find that a defendant willfully and unlawfully committed an act that by its nature would probably and directly result in physical force being applied to the person of another may permit a conviction premised on facts the defendant should have known but did not actually know. Thus, under the instruction given, a jury could conceivably convict a defendant for assault even if he did not actually know the facts sufficient to establish that his act by its nature would probably and directly result in a battery." (Ibid.) On the issue of prejudice, however, the court went on to explain that "any instructional error is largely technical and is unlikely to affect the outcome of most assault cases, because a defendant's knowledge of the relevant factual circumstances is rarely in dispute." ( Williams, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 790.) In People v. Williams (2001) the California Supreme Court acknowledged that "Colantuono's language relying exclusively on general intent to describe the requisite mental state and implying a negligence standard may have been confusing" and thus clarified the mental state for assault. ( Id. at p. 787.) "Assault requires actual knowledge of the facts sufficient to establish that the defendant's act by its nature will probably and directly result in injury to another." ( Id. at p. 782.) "In other words, a defendant guilty of assault must be aware of the facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that a battery would directly, naturally and probably result from his conduct. He may not be convicted based on facts he did not know but should have known. He, however, need not be subjectively aware of the risk that a battery might occur." ( Id. at p. 788.) "For example, a defendant who honestly believes that his act was not likely to result in a battery is still guilty of assault if a reasonable person, viewing the facts known to defendant, would find that the act would directly, naturally and probably result in a battery." ( Id. at p. 788, fn. 3.) The instruction given by the trial court in Williams (former CALJIC No. 9.00 (1994 Rev.) (5th ed. 1995 supp.)) provided in pertinent part: "'1. A person willfully and unlawfully committed an act that by its nature would probably and directly result in the application of physical force on another person; and P 2. At the time the act was committed, such person had the present ability to apply physical force to the person of another.'" (Williams, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 783.) Williams found the instruction "potentially ambiguous" because "'the test of natural and probable consequences is an objective one' citation" and "a jury could conceivably convict a defendant for assault even if he did not actually know the facts sufficient to establish that his act by its nature would probably and directly result in a battery." ( Id. at p. 790, quoting People v. Smith, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 1480.) Even so, Williams concluded that "any instructional error is largely technical" and "unlikely to affect the outcome" because a defendant's knowledge of the facts is "rarely" disputed. (Ibid.) Applied to the facts before it, Williams determined that the any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Ibid.)The California Supreme Court explained the mens rea necessary for assault: "A defendant guilty of assault must be aware of the facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that a battery would directly, naturally and probably result from his conduct. He may not be convicted based on facts he did not know but should have known. He, however, need not be subjectively aware of the risk that a battery might occur." (Id. at p. 788, ) In other words, "assault does not require a specific intent to cause injury or a subjective awareness of the risk that an injury might occur. Rather, assault only requires an intentional act and actual knowledge of those facts sufficient to establish that the act by its nature will probably and directly result in the application of physical force against another." (Id. at p. 790.)