In Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644, the plaintiff neither saw nor heard the defendant's car hit and injure her child. The mother only became aware of the injury when someone told her it had occurred. She then rushed to the scene to see her child lying unconscious and bleeding in the road. The Supreme Court held the plaintiff could not state an NIED claim because she was neither present at the scene of the injury-creating event when it occurred nor contemporaneously aware that it was causing injury to her child. (Thing, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 669.) The court observed that "reliance on foreseeability of injury alone in finding a duty, and thus a right to recover, is not adequate when the damages sought are for an intangible injury. In order to avoid limitless liability out of all proportion to the degree of a defendant's negligence, and against which it is impossible to insure without imposing unacceptable costs on those among whom the risk is spread, the right to recover for negligently caused emotional distress must be limited." (Id. at p. 664.) The court held that a plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress caused by observing the negligently inflicted injury of a third person, if he or she: "(1) is closely related to the injury victim; (2) is present at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the victim; (3) as a result suffers serious emotional distress--a reaction beyond that which would be anticipated in a disinterested witness and which is not an abnormal response to the circumstances." (Thing, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 667-668.)