In Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal. App. 4th 573, Division Five of the Second District held the defendant bank was entitled to rely on the plaintiff's "factually devoid" form interrogatory answers as the evidential basis for its motion for summary judgment. ( Id. at pp. 580-581.) This was so, the court reasoned, because after reviewing the history behind the amendments, it was clear the Legislature "intended that the burden-shifting characteristics of rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . as interpreted in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (1986). . . were to be applied to California summary judgment motions when a defendant relied on a plaintiff's factually inadequate discovery answers to seek summary judgment. Now, a moving defendant may rely on factually devoid discovery responses to shift the burden of proof . . . . Once the burden shifts as a result of the factually devoid discovery responses, the plaintiff must set forth the specific facts which prove the existence of a triable issue of material fact. The express language of the 1992 and 1993 amendments and the judicially noticed legislative history demonstrate the foregoing was intended by the Legislature." ( Id. at p. 590.)