In Vandenberg v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal. 4th 815, the Supreme Court specifically discussed the term "legally obligated to pay as damages" as that phrase is used in a general liability policy. It did so in the context of a liability insurer's denial of coverage for damages awarded against an insured on the ground that the damages were assessed on a contractual theory. The insurer, citing a number of Court of Appeal decisions, had argued that the phrase "legally obligated to pay as damages" referred only to a liability based upon a breach of duty imposed by law, that is, based on tort not on contract. The insured in Vandenberg was held liable for the breach of a long-term real property lease based on the contamination of soils located on the leased property and the underlying groundwater. In Vandenberg, the lessor had alleged, and an arbitrator had subsequently held, that the lessee's improper installation, maintenance and use of waste oil storage tanks on the leased property had caused the contamination of soils and groundwater and the lessee's acts constituted a breach of the lease agreements. A $ 4 million award by the arbitrator was subsequently confirmed by the judgment of the superior court. The court held, however, that whether the third party's claim was based on tort or contract was not the proper question. Rather, it was the "nature of the damage and the risk involved, in light of particular policy provisions, which would control coverage." (Vandenberg, supra, 21 Cal. 4th at p. 839.) The court specifically rejected the proposition that the phrase " 'legally obligated to pay' " necessarily excluded coverage for liability arising from a breach of contract. (Ibid.) "This phrase had usually been construed to mean liability imposed in a definite sum by a final judgment against the assured." (Ibid.) To conclude, however, that such phrase could only refer to a tort claim asserted against the insured would ignore settled principles of insurance contract interpretation. (Ibid.) Vandenberg applied that principle: "A reasonable layperson would certainly understand 'legally obligated to pay' to refer to any obligation which is binding and enforceable under the law, whether pursuant to contract or tort liability. Further, a reasonable layperson, cognizant that he or she is purchasing a 'general liability' insurance policy, would not conclude such coverage term only refers to liability pled in tort, and thus entirely excludes liability pled on a theory of breach of contract. Under general insurance principles, we must interpret the phrase 'legally obligated to pay as damages' in accordance with the ordinary and popular sense, not the legalistic, and erroneously premised, interpretation of the language urged by insurers." (Vandenberg, supra, 21 Cal. 4th at p. 840.) Quoting several commentators with approval, the Vandenberg court concluded, " 'Whether a particular claim falls within the coverage afforded by a liability policy is not affected by the form of the legal proceeding. Accordingly, the legal theory asserted by the claimant is immaterial to the determination of whether the risk is covered.' . . . 'The expression "legally obligated" connotes legal responsibility that is broad in scope. It is directed at civil liability . . . which can arise from either unintentional (negligent) or intentional tort, under common law, statute, or contract.' . . . 'The coverage agreement which embraces "all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages . . . ." . . . is intentionally broad enough to include the insured's obligation to pay damages for breach of contract as well as for tort, within limitations imposed by other terms of the coverage agreement (e.g. bodily injury and property damage as defined, caused by an occurrence) and by the exclusions . . . .'" (Vandenberg, supra, 21 Cal. 4th at p. 841) Vandenberg said no more than whatever the interpretation to be given to the term "legally obligated," it must be broad enough to include "damages for breach of contract as well as for tort." (Vandenberg, supra, 21 Cal. 4th at p. 841.) The court was only making the simple point that it was not the "form of the proceeding" (ibid.) that would control coverage, but rather that the issue would be resolved by a determination as to whether the acts of the insured had created a risk covered under the policy which resulted in either bodily injury or property damage to another. If those requirements were satisfied, it would not matter that the third party claimant's theory of recovery was based on contract rather than on tort.