Under the respondeat superior doctrine, an employer is vicariously liable for the torts of an employee which are committed within the scope of the employment. (Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital (1995) 12 Cal.4th 291, 296; Farmers Ins. Group v. County of Santa Clara (1995) 11 Cal.4th 992, 1003.) The California Supreme Court explained the scope of employment principles under the respondeat superior doctrine as follows: "In Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc. (1986) 41 Cal.3d 962, . . ., we explained scope of employment principles under the respondeat superior doctrine as follows: 'An employer is liable for risks "arising out of the employment." A risk arises out of the employment when "in the context of the particular enterprise an employee's conduct is not so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from it among other costs of the employer's business. In other words, where the question is one of vicarious liability, the inquiry should be whether the risk was one 'that may fairly be regarded as typical of or broadly incidental' to the enterprise undertaken by the employer. " Accordingly, the employer's liability extends beyond his actual or possible control of the employee to include risks inherent in or created by the enterprise.' (Perez, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 968, employer vicariously liable for injuries sustained by plaintiff when he was knocked from a tractor driven by employee while disking employer's orchard.) (Farmers Ins. Group v. County of Santa Clara, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1003.) In Farmers Ins. Group, the Supreme Court set forth the foreseeability test for evaluating a respondeat superior court claim: "As the Court of Appeal elaborated in Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co. (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 608, 618-619: 'One way to determine whether a risk is inherent in, or created by, an enterprise is to ask whether the actual occurrence was a generally foreseeable consequence of the activity. However, 'foreseeability' in this context must be distinguished from 'foreseeability' as a test for negligence. In the latter sense 'foreseeable' means a level of probability which would lead a prudent person to take effective precautions whereas 'foreseeability' as a test for respondeat superior merely means that in the context of the particular enterprise an employee's conduct is not so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from it among other costs of the employer's business. "We find the Rodgers foreseeability test useful because it reflects the central justification for respondeat superior: that losses fairly attributable to an enterprise-those which foreseeably result from the conduct of the enterprise-should be allocated to the enterprise as a cost of doing business. " (Farmers Ins. Group v. County of Santa Clara, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 1003-1004.) In Farmers Ins. Group, the Supreme Court explained the application of the respondeat superior doctrine to the employment context: "In California, the scope of employment has been interpreted broadly under the respondeat superior doctrine. For example, 'the fact that an employee is not engaged in the ultimate object of his employment at the time of his wrongful act does not preclude attribution of liability to an employer.' Thus, acts necessary to the comfort, convenience, health, and welfare of the employee while at work, though strictly personal and not acts of service, do not take the employee outside the scope of employment. Moreover, '"where the employee is combining his own business with that of his employer, or attending to both at substantially the same time, no nice inquiry will be made as to which business he was actually engaged in at the time of injury, unless it clearly appears that neither directly nor indirectly could he have been serving his employer." ' It is also settled that an employer's vicarious liability may extend to willful and malicious torts of an employee as well as negligence. Finally, an employee's tortious act may be within the scope of employment even if it contravenes an express company rule and confers no benefit to the employer. " (Farmers Ins. Group v. County of Santa Clara, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 1004 see Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 202, 209; John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438, 447-450; Alma W. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 133, 139.) The Supreme Court identified the circumstances where the respondeat superior doctrine is inapplicable as matter of law in the employment context: where an employee engages in malicious or tortious conduct for personal purposes which substantially deviates from employment duties; if an employee "inflicts an injury out of personal malice, not engendered by the employment"; if the employee acts out of "personal malice unconnected with the employment"; or if the misconduct is not an "outgrowth" of the employment. (Farmer's Ins. Group v. County of Santa Clara, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1005; accord John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist., supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 447; Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec. Co. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 956, 960; Carr v. Wm. C. Crowell Co. (1946) 28 Cal.2d 652, 656.) Citing Alma W. v. Oakland Unified School Dist., supra, 123 Cal.App.3d at page 140, a case involving molestation of a student by a school janitor, the Supreme Court in Farmer's Ins. Group, synthesized the applicable rule: "Stated another way, 'if an employee's tort is personal in nature, mere presence at the place of employment and attendance to occupational duties prior or subsequent to the offense will not give rise to a cause of action against the employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior.' (Alma W., supra, 123 Cal.App.3d at p. 140.) In such cases, the losses do not foreseeably result from the conduct of the employer's enterprise and so are not fairly attributable to the employer as a cost of doing business." (Farmer's Ins. Group v. County of Santa Clara, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1005.) In Farmers Ins. Group, the Supreme Court identified situations where employers were held liable for an employee's negligence: "Our review of the case law discloses that an employer may be subject to vicarious liability for injuries caused by an employee's tortious actions resulting or arising from pursuit of the employer's interests. (E.g., Perez, supra, 41 Cal.3d 962 tractor operator carried unauthorized passenger while serving the employer's business; De Rosier v. Crow (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 476 waitress employed by bowling alley/liquor bar attempted to stop fight involving patrons and owner of bowling alley/bar; Caldwell v. Farley (1955) 134 Cal.App.2d 84 union steward struck union member who expressed opinion against strike; Sullivan v. Matt (1955) 130 Cal.App.2d 134 railroad superintendent, acting to further the interests of his company, assaulted yardman for attentions to superintendent's secretary; Stansell v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1941) 44 Cal.App.2d 822 assault during dispute with customer over an order; Pritchard v. Gilbert (1951) 107 Cal.App.2d 1 traveling salesman, while driving car on employer's business, lost temper and beat motorist over near accident; Martin v. Leatham (1937) 22 Cal.App.2d 442 private detective, hired to maintain order in skating rink, engaged in altercation with patron seeking admission, and shot decedent, who had intervened to stop the fight.) Vicarious liability may also be proper where the tortious conduct results or arises from a dispute over the performance of an employee's duties, even though the conduct is not intended to benefit the employer or to further the employer's interests. (E.g., Fields v. Sanders (1947) 29 Cal.2d 834 employee truck driver beat motorist with wrench during dispute over employee's driving on a company job; Carr v. Wm. C. Crowell Co., supra, 28 Cal.2d 652 employee of general contractor threw hammer at subcontractor during dispute over construction procedure.) Vicarious liability may even be appropriate for injuries caused after work hours where a dispute arises over the rights and privileges of off-duty employees. (Rodgers, supra, 50 Cal.App.3d 608 injuries inflicted by off-duty employees of general contractor during dispute over right to use subcontractor's equipment.) In these types of situations, the tortious actions are engendered by events or conditions relating to the employment and therefore are properly allocable to the employer." (Farmers Ins. Group v. County of Santa Clara, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 1005-1006.)