In Weston Group, Inc. v. A. B. Hirschfeld Press, Inc., 845 P.2d 1162, 1167 (Colo. 1993), the Colorado Supreme Court declined to change to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 259(1) rule for the following reasons: It must be noted, however, that in a line of cases originating before the beginning of the twentieth century, we have recognized the general rule to be that in absence of designation by a debtor, the creditor generally may apply the debtor's payments among matured debts in any way the creditor desires. . . . None of those cases has suggested a requirement that the creditor manifest its intention to the debtor, even though section 391 of the Restatement (First) of Contracts (1932), which had been published long before Jacksonv. A.B.Z. Lumber Co., 155 Colo. 33, 392 P.2d 288 (1964) (stating that where a debtor does not apply payment, "creditor is allowed to make the appropriation in a way most advantageous for himself"; but did not resolve whether creditor must manifest its intent to debtor), was decided, contained such a requirement. In the absence of such a suggestion, we believe that our cases can most reasonably be read not to impose a requirement of manifestation of the creditor's intent in order to make the creditor's application of the debtor's payments effective. This is an area of the law in which special importance attaches to the clarity and stability of rules, for predictable consequences are important in conducting commercial transactions. If, as we believe, creditors have been led to rely on the absence of a requirement of manifestation of intent as a condition to effectiveness of the application of an undesignated payment by a debtor, we are reluctant to deny that reliance its intended consequence. Furthermore, the dearth of cases presenting this issue during the period of more than a century during which cases involving application of payments on multiple obligations have come before appellate courts in this state suggests that the absence of a manifestation of intent requirement has presented no significant impediment to the conduct of commercial transactions. (845 P.2d at 1167-68.)