Attempted Sexual Assault In the First Degree Connecticut
To convict the defendant of attempted sexual assault in the first degree in violation of 53a-70 and 53a-49 (a) (2), the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with the specific intent to commit sexual assault in the first degree, which, in turn, included the intent to have sexual intercourse and that the defendant took a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.
Intent may be inferred from the conduct of the accused and is a determination for the trier of fact. State v. Osborn, 41 Conn. App. 287, 296, 676 A.2d 399 (1996). That the evidence is circumstantial rather than direct does not diminish the force of that evidence. State v. Brown, 235 Conn. 502, 510, 668 A.2d 1288 (1995).
"The state must prove every essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt and, while the jury may draw reasonable and logical inferences, it may not resort to speculation. State v. Tucker, 181 Conn. 406, 417-18, 435 A.2d 986 (1980); State v. Saracino, 178 Conn. 416, 419, 423 A.2d 102 (1979)." State v. Green, 194 Conn. 258, 274, 480 A.2d 526 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1191, 105 S. Ct. 964, 83 L. Ed. 2d 969 (1985).
Likewise, "what constitutes a substantial step in any given case is a matter of degree and a question of fact for the trier. . . . the substantial step must be at least the start of a line of conduct which will lead naturally to the commission of a crime . . . ." State v. Osborn, supra, 41 Conn. App. 294.