In In re Stanley D., 61 Conn. App. 224, 230, 763 A.2d 83 (2000) the Court addressed a claim that the trial court improperly found that the respondent had not achieved sufficient personal rehabilitation within the meaning of 17a-112 (c) (3) (B). Id., at 225. In the explanation of the requirements of 17a-112 (c) (3) (B) and the hearing process for petitions to terminate parental rights based on that section, the Court stated that "'personal rehabilitation' refers to the reasonable foreseeability of the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent, not merely the ability to manage his or her own life. . . . In the adjudicatory phase, the court may rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time." Id., at 230.