In In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 613 A.2d 748 (1992), the respondent mother argued that termination of her parental rights in her infant child on the basis of an absence of an ongoing parent-child relationship was improper because the state was responsible for the absence of such a relationship, having had custody of the child virtually since her birth. The Court held that under the facts of that case, the state could not terminate the respondent mother's rights on that basis. The court reasoned that: "as the facts of this case demonstrate . . . once the child had been placed in foster care pursuant to the determinations made under General Statutes 46b-129, a finding of a lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship three and one-half months later was inevitable under the termination statute because absent extraordinary and heroic efforts by the respondent, the petitioner was destined to have established the absence of such a relationship. Thus, a factual predicate for custody, established by the lesser standard of a preponderance of the evidence, led inexorably, for all practical purposes, to the factual predicate for termination required to be established by the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence." 223 Conn. at 533-34. In In re Valerie D., the adjudication of a lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship was three and one-half months after the infant child had entered foster care. The trial court in that case terminated the mother's parental rights but, in its memorandum of decision, expressed reservations because the absence of a parent-child relationship was not for lack of effort on the mother's part. 223 Conn. at 531. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of this court, concluding that on the basis of the record, "the lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship between the respondent and the child was the direct result of the fact that the child was in foster care . . . for almost the entire period of time between the birth and the adjudication date." 223 Conn. at 531. The Supreme Court further stated that "we agree with the implicit conclusion of the trial court in this case that, in such a case, the inquiry must focus, not on the feelings of the infant, but on the positive feelings of the natural parent." 223 Conn. at 532. The commissioner had custody of the child from birth, and, shortly thereafter, the court terminated the mother's parental rights based, in part, on the court's conclusion that there was no ongoing parent-child relationship. The respondent mother appealed to this court, and we affirmed the judgment. In re Valerie D., 25 Conn. App. 586, 595 A.2d 922 (1991). The Court reversed our judgment and remanded the case to the trial court with direction to render judgment for the respondent mother. In re Valerie D., supra, 223 Conn. 535. The Supreme Court reasoned that "as the facts of this case demonstrate . . . once the child had been placed in foster care pursuant to the determinations made under 46b-129, a finding of a lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship three and one-half months later was inevitable under the termination statute because absent extraordinary and heroic efforts by the respondent, the petitioner was destined to have established the absence of such a relationship. Thus, a factual predicate for custody, established under the lesser standard of a preponderance of the evidence, led inexorably, for all practical purposes, to the factual predicate for termination required to be established by the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence." Id., 533-34. The Court concluded that the state was not permitted to terminate the parental rights of a mother on the basis on no ongoing parent-child relationship. In In re Valerie D., the child was removed from her mother's care from nearly the moment of birth until the adjudication date. Id., 531. Coterminous petitions were filed for custody and termination of parental rights virtually upon the birth of the child. Id., 532. The court concluded that under the circumstances, the petition for temporary custody virtually assured the creation of a ground for termination of parental rights. Id., 533. In other words, the state's custody of the child created the conditions leading to the lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship.