In Santiago v. State, 47 Conn. Sup. 130, 779 A.2d 868 (1999), aff'd, 64 Conn. App. 67, 779 A.2d 775, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 913, 782 A.2d 1246 (2001), the court stated: "The primary test to be utilized is whether an injustice was done and whether it is probable that on a new trial a different result would be realized. . . . "This court believes that some consideration should be given to the language in Taborsky v. State, 142 Conn. 619, 623, 116 A.2d 433 (1955): All of the above rules are qualified in their application to a capital case in light of the principle laid down in Andersen v. State, 43 Conn. 514, 517 (1876), that in a case where human life is at stake, justice, as well as humanity, requires us to pause and consider before we apply those rules in all their rigor. . . . "In this court's opinion, an underlying principle of Taborsky and Andersen is that in certain serious criminal cases, if it appears to the court that evidence which is adduced at the hearing on the petition for new trial could have a persuasive impact on a jury and might well be sufficient to turn the cause in favor of the applicant . . . an injustice would be done to the petitioner if a new trial is not granted even if all the traditional criteria for granting a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence are not satisfied." (Santiago v. State, supra, 47 Conn. Sup. 131-32.)