In State v. Coleman, 41 Conn. App. 255, 272, 675 A.2d 887 (1996), rev'd on other grounds, 242 Conn. 523, 700 A.2d 14 (1997) the defendant was charged with burglary in the first degree alleging that "on or about the 4th day of March, 1986, prior to 4:00 a.m., in the area of . . . Orange Street, the defendant entered or remained unlawfully in a building with the intent to commit a crime therein (to wit: a sexual assault and/or theft), and he was armed with a dangerous instrument (to wit: a sharp cutting instrument), in violation of Section 53a-101 (a) (1) of the Connecticut General Statutes." State v. Coleman, supra, 242 Conn. at 533 n.16. The trial court dismissed that count, but considered the state's request to consider a lesser included offense of burglary in the second degree. Id. at 530-31. The state filed a substitute information alleging burglary in the second degree, and the defendant subsequently was convicted of burglary in the second degree. State v. Coleman, supra at 531. The defendant appealed to this court in State v. Coleman, supra, 41 Conn. App. at 255, arguing that the charging instrument violated his constitutional right to fair notice. Id. at 270. The Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court and concluded that in light of the information, the charge of burglary in the second degree was a lesser included offense. Id. at 272-73. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed our decision after a careful examination of the charging instrument. The Supreme Court noted that the information failed to contain specific facts and alleged only "that the defendant had burglarized a building . . . and that it was possible for the defendant to have committed the crime of burglary in the first degree . . . without also having committed the lesser offense of entering a dwelling . . . ." State v. Coleman, supra, 242 Conn. at 533.