State v. Troupe

In State v. Troupe, 237 Conn. 284, 294, 677 A.2d 917 (1996) the Court expressly modified the doctrine to allow constancy of accusation testimony for the limited purpose of showing only that a complaint was made. Id., at 304. Testimony is to be restricted to such facts as the identity of the alleged perpetrator and the timing of the victim's complaint, details to be "limited to those necessary to associate the victim's complaint with the pending charge . . . . Thus, such evidence is admissible only to corroborate the victim's testimony and not for substantive purposes. Before the evidence may be admitted, therefore, the victim must first have testified concerning the facts of the sexual assault and the identity of the person or persons to whom the incident was reported." Id., at 304-305. The court's modification of the constancy of accusation rule was codified in 6-11 (c) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. Connecticut Code of Evidence 6-11 (c) provides in relevant part: "A person to whom a sexual assault victim has reported the alleged assault may testify that the allegation was made and when it was made, provided the victim has testified to the facts of the alleged assault and to the identity of the person or persons to whom the assault was reported. . . . The testimony of the witness is admissible only to corroborate the victim's testimony and not for substantive purposes." In Troupe, the Supreme Court held that "although we agree that the assumptions underlying the constancy of accusation doctrine are unfounded, we are also cognizant of the fact that those misconceptions are not uncommon. . . . Hence, we hesitate to discard the benefit of this rule to a woman who does complain without a clearer understanding of the burdens the rule may impose on the woman who does not complain." Id., at 301-302 In Troupe, the court acknowledged that the admission of constancy of accusation testimony does not violate the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment. State v. Troupe, supra, 237 Conn. at 293. The reasoning is that the clause is not violated by admitting declarant's out-of-court statements "as long as the declarant is testifying as a witness and subject to full and effective cross-examination." Id., at 292. "Because constancy of accusation evidence is not admissible unless the victim has testified, and is subject to cross-examination, concerning the crime and the identity of the person or persons to whom the victim has reported the crime . . . ."; ; id., at 293; there is no constitutional violation. Id. The Court limited the common-law rule, holding that: "a person to whom a sexual assault victim has reported the assault may testify only with respect to the fact and timing of the victim's complaint; any testimony by the witness regarding the details surrounding the assault must be strictly limited to those necessary to associate the victim's complaint with the pending charge, including, for example, the time and place of the attack or the identity of the alleged perpetrator. In all other respects, our current rules remain in effect. Thus, such evidence is admissible only to corroborate the victim's testimony and not for substantive purposes." State v. Troupe, supra, at 304. The Court modified the constancy of accusation doctrine so that the person to whom a sexual assault is reported may not testify as to the details of the assault to corroborate the complaint. In Troupe, the court made clear that its ruling "does not affect those cases in which the details of a sexual assault complaint are otherwise admissible" under the exceptions to the rule against hearsay. Id., 304 n.19. The Court concluded that "a person to whom a sexual assault victim has reported the assault may testify only with respect to the fact and timing of the victim's complaint; any testimony by the witness regarding the details surrounding the assault must be strictly limited to those necessary to associate the victim's complaint with the pending charge, including, for example, the time and place of the attack or the identity of the alleged perpetrator. . . . Thus, such evidence is admissible only to corroborate the victim's testimony and not for substantive purposes." Id. at 304. The court noted, however, that the articulated doctrine "does not affect those cases in which the details of a sexual assault complaint are otherwise admissible . . . ." Id. at 304 n.19. The Court, while declining to abandon the exception, modified the constancy of accusation doctrine. The court concluded that "a person to whom a sexual assault victim has reported the assault may testify only with respect to the fact and timing of the victim's complaint; any testimony by the witness regarding the details surrounding the assault must be strictly limited to those necessary to associate the victim's complaint with the pending charge, including, for example, the time and place of the attack or the identity of the alleged perpetrator. . . . Thus, such evidence is admissible only to corroborate the victim's testimony and not for substantive purposes. Before the evidence may be admitted, therefore, the victim must first have testified concerning the facts of the sexual assault and the identity of the person or persons to whom the incident was reported. In determining whether to permit such testimony, the trial court must balance the probative value of the evidence against any prejudice to the defendant." Id., 304-305.