State v. Tweedy
In State v. Tweedy, 219 Conn. 489, 594 A.2d 906 (1991), the defendant was charged with and convicted of two counts of kidnapping in the first degree after he forced his way into the victim's apartment, demanded money, followed her into her bedroom, received money from her, took a camera, commanded her to undress and to sit on her bed, took jewelry, sexually assaulted her and thereafter ordered her at gunpoint to an automated teller machine to make a withdrawal to give to him.
The defendant was convicted of two counts of robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes 53a-134 (a) (4).
"The convictions were based upon two counts of the substitute information, in which the state respectively alleged that the defendant had robbed the victim at approximately 8:30 a.m. on October 2, 1988, at her apartment in the City of New Haven, and then had robbed her again at approximately 9:00 a.m. on October 2, 1998 at 77 Broadway her bank in New Haven . . . . According to the defendant, the events at the victim's apartment and the bank were part of a continuing transaction during which he committed a single robbery. The separation of this transaction to form the basis of two robbery charges and convictions, the defendant maintains, contravenes the legislature's intent that the unit of prosecution for the crime of robbery turn upon the number of victims intimidated by a defendant's use or threatened use of force. Where, as here, a single victim is subjected to continuous intimidation by a defendant's unceasing forcible conduct, the defendant claims that the legislature intended that such a course of conduct be punished as a single robbery." State v. Tweedy, supra, 219 Conn. 496-97. The Supreme Court did not agree. Id., 497.
"Double jeopardy prohibits multiple punishments for the same offense in the context of a single trial. Nonetheless, distinct repetitions of a prohibited act, however closely they may follow each other . . . may be punished as separate crimes without offending the double jeopardy clause. . . . The same transaction, in other words, may constitute separate and distinct crimes where it is susceptible of separation into parts, each of which in itself constitutes a completed offense. . . . The test is not whether the criminal intent is one and the same and inspiring the whole transaction, but whether separate acts have been committed with the requisite criminal intent and are such as made punishable by the statute." Id., 497-98.
In Tweedy, the Court held with respect to General Statutes 53a-133 that "the legislature . . . expressly designated the course of committing a larceny, rather than the course of forcible conduct, as the time frame for completion of the offense of robbery." State v. Tweedy, supra, 219 Conn. 498-99.The court reasoned that under those facts, there was no double jeopardy violation on the conviction of two counts of kidnapping under General Statutes 53a-92 (a) (2) (A) and (B) because they were separate offenses. State v. Tweedy, 219 Conn. at 496.
General Statutes 53a-92 (a) provides in relevant part: "A person is guilty of kidnapping in the first degree when he abducts another person and . . . (2) he restrains the person abducted with intent to (A) inflict physical injury upon him or violate or abuse him sexually; or (B) accomplish or advance the commission of a felony . . . ."
In one count, under subdivision (A), the state had to prove that the defendant abducted the victim with the specific intent to violate or to abuse her sexually. Id.
In the other count, under subdivision (B), the state had to prove that the defendant abducted the victim with the specific intent to achieve the felonious objective of robbery. Id.