In Barkley v. State, 724 A.2d 558 (Del. 1999), the Delaware Supreme Court held that a statutory mandate for immediate revocation of driving privileges upon a drug conviction is a direct consequence of a criminal plea, unlike the revocation for traffic offenses accomplished through separate collateral administrative proceedings: In our view, the revocation accomplished by the sentencing judge under 21 Del.C. 4177K is a penalty and, not only a direct consequence of the sentencing, but a necessary and integral part of the sentencing process. Unlike the deportation proceeding implicated in State v. Christie, Barkley's loss of driving privileges at the time of sentencing was an immediate, automatic and mandatory penalty. The State argues that since the State's granting of a license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege, not a right, the denial of that privilege may not give rise to a claim of lack of due process. The State's position that a driver's license is a privilege is generally correct and its argument relating to the consequences of that status as a privilege may be valid in the context of administrative proceedings leading to license revocation. But, it misses the mark in this case where, for purposes of Rule 11(c) in light of the statutory language, the revocation occurs as an automatic and mandatory penal consequence of the sentencing process. Because the revocation is part of the "mandatory minimum penalty" under Rule 11(c), as we now hold, the failure to secure the defendant's understanding of that consequence, constitutes a violation of the Rule (Id. at 560-61.)