As set forth in Morris v. Shahan, Del. Super (1993), the evidentiary rules applicable to a hearing before the Division of Motor Vehicles are as follows: Although there is no statutory authority for the proposition, it is generally excepted in Delaware that strict adherence to the rules of evidence is not required in administrative proceedings. See, e.g., In the Matter of Charles J. Sweeney Jr., Del. Super., 257 A.2d 764, 765 (1969). ("A suspension or revocation hearing before the Commissioner need not have all the procedures and formalities of a court action in order to meet the requirements of due process, but a defendant has the right to be confronted by his accuser" refusing to permit police officer's report to be admitted into evidence when officer not present); Saxton v. Voshell, Del. Super., C.A. No. 90A-JN-12, Toliver, J. (April 9, 1991) (citing Sweeny, supra, for the proposition that in revocation proceedings "strict adherence to the Delaware Rules of Evidence [is] unnecessary" permitting officer who did not perform the calibration tests on an intoxilyzer machine to admit the results into evidence); Barnett, 514 A.2d at 1147 ("hearsay evidence is permitted for certain purposes in administrative hearings," but "the findings of an administrative body cannot rest along on hearsay evidence" holding that, absent personal knowledge, a police officer may not testify as to the results of field sobriety tests conducted by another officer); Reams v. Division of Motor Vehicles, Del. Super., C.A. No. 90A-09-12, Goldstein, J. (Feb. 28, 1991) ("the DMV is not bound by the Delaware Rules of Evidence" but holding that it was within the hearing officer's discretion to refuse to admit the officer's recollection of intoxilyzer test results without the evidence card he recorded them on).