In Acosta v. Richter, 671 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1996), the Court addressed when patient medical records may be disclosed. Id. at 155. At the time Acosta was rendered, the Legislature had carved out only three limited exceptions to when this may happen. Since then, the Legislature has added two more. These exceptions, like those provided in medical negligence actions, illustrate the Legislature's emphasis on providing a limited and specific avenue of disclosure for patient medical information. Section 456.057(7)(a) lists the exceptions for the disclosure of medical records as follows: Medical records may be furnished without written authorization under the following circumstances: To any person, firm, or corporation that has procured or furnished such examination or treatment with the patient's consent. When compulsory physical examination is made pursuant to Rule 1.360, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, in which case copies of the medical records shall be furnished to both the defendant and the plaintiff. In any civil or criminal action, unless otherwise prohibited by law, upon the issuance of a subpoena from a court of competent jurisdiction and proper notice to the patient or the patient's legal representative by the party seeking such records. For statistical and scientific research, provided the information is abstracted in such a way as to protect the identity of the patient or provided written permission is received from the patient or the patient's legal representative. To a regional poison control center for purposes of treating a poison episode under evaluation, case management of poison cases, or compliance with data collection and reporting requirements of s. 395.1027 and the professional organization that certifies poison control centers in accordance with federal law. 456.057(7)(a)(1)-(5), Fla. Stat. (2009). In Acosta, the Court noted that "these 'exceptions' are straightforward and require no further explanation here." 671 So. 2d at 155. In Acosta, the Court rejected the suggested interpretation that the exceptions to the confidentiality privilege were intended to create such a broad exception that essentially it does away with the physician-patient privilege in all medical negligence cases. Id. at 155. By including the phrase "when a health care provider is or reasonably expects to be named as a defendant," the Legislature recognized that there are instances when a health care provider is not, and does not reasonably expect to be, named as a defendant. Under such circumstances, the exceptions to the statute, which otherwise prohibit disclosure, are not triggered. Id. Conversely, when a health care provider is or expects to be named as a defendant, "common sense dictates that . . . the provider should be able to discuss patient information to defend himself or herself in a medical negligence action brought by the patient." Id. at 156. This exception, nevertheless, is "narrow in scope and patently logical and consistent with other provisions of the statute, which contrasts sharply with the idea that the legislature intended to do away with the privilege entirely . . . ." Id. In Acosta, the Court rejected the notion that the statute at issue violates a physician's First Amendment right to free speech. See 671 So. 2d at 156. The Court "found no First Amendment flaw" because the statute strikes a balance between a patient's individual privacy rights and society's need for limited disclosure of medical information. Id. Physicians' free speech rights are not completely inhibited because physicians may discuss confidential patient information if they become parties to a medical negligence legal action. By providing this "safeguard, as well as providing other means for disclosure," we held that the Legislature properly created a limitation on speech concerning a patient without violating the First Amendment. Id.