In Askew v. Firestone, 421 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 1982), the Court struck a ballot summary that did not set out the chief purpose of the amendment. The summary stated that the amendment "prohibits former legislators and statewide elected officers from representing other persons or entities for compensation before any state government body for a period of 2 years following vacation of office, unless they file full and public disclosure of their financial interests." 421 So. 2d at 153. The Court found that the summary flew under false colors because it did not convey the true purpose and meaning of the amendment, which was to override statutory law providing for a complete two-year ban on lobbying. See id. at 155-56. In Askew, the summary violated this requirement because it indicated that the amendment would restrict lobbying activities by former legislators and elected officials, whereas the amendment would actually have removed a two-year ban on lobbying already contained in the state constitution. See 421 So. 2d at 155- 56. The Court examined a proposed amendment to article II, section 8(e), that would remove the absolute two-year ban on certain lobbying activities by former legislators and statewide elected officers and replace the ban with a financial disclosure option. The proposed ballot summary accurately stated that the amendment would prohibit those officials from certain lobbying activities for two years after leaving office unless they filed public financial disclosure statements. Id. at 153. The Court nevertheless struck the ballot caption and summary from the ballot. The Court did so because the summary failed to also advise the public that section 8(e) already contained an absolute two-year ban on certain lobbying. Id. at 155. This omission in the summary left the impression that the amendment's chief purpose was to impose restrictions on lobbying, when in reality the goal was to relax the existing ones. The Court struck a proposed amendment from the ballot with a title, "Financial Disclosure Required Before Lobbying by Former Legislature and Statewide Elective Officers," and a summary which provided that the proposed amendment would impose financial-disclosure restrictions on former legislators and elected officials who sought to lobby before any state government body. The Court concluded that the proposed amendment "flew under false colors" because the summary failed to note that the amendment would actually abolish an existing two-year complete ban on such lobbying activities: Although the summary indicates that the amendment is a restriction on one's lobbying activities, the amendment actually gives incumbent office holders, upon filing a financial disclosure statement, a right to immediately commence lobbying before their former agencies which is presently precluded. The problem, therefore, lies not with what the summary says, but, rather, with what it does not say. . . . . If the legislature feels that the present prohibition against appearing before one's former colleagues is wrong, it is appropriate for that body to pass a joint resolution and to ask the citizens to modify that prohibition. But such a change must stand on its own merits and not be disguised as something else. (Id. at 155-56.)