Does the Trial Court Lack Jurisdiction to Try a Defendant After the Expiration of the Default Period ?
In Llanusa v. Glickstein, 376 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), the Fourth District extended White to include a post-expiration continuance taken for the purposes of additional discovery. See id. at 46.
This result was premised on the conclusion that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to conduct a trial of the petitioner "absent a proper extension of time within which a defendant must be brought to trial or a justifiable excuse under the terms of [the rule] why trial was not commenced within 180 days." Id.
Because the court no longer possessed jurisdiction over the defendant, the Fourth District concluded that the post-expiration motion for continuance had no effect. See id.;
Ballard v. Kaney, 397 So. 2d 1042, 1042 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) ("When the speedy trial rule period has run the right of the accused to discharge is not affected by acts which might have earlier constituted a waiver.");
Muller v. State, 387 So. 2d 1037, 1039 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (applying Llanusa to post-expiration continuance taken prior to the filing of a motion for discharge);
Hammock v. State, 330 So. 2d 522, 524 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) ("A demonstration of unpreparedness for trial which is developed after the 180-day period has elapsed, and which has no record support during the 180-day period, does not toll the speedy trial rule.").
Each of these pre-1984 decisions is implicitly founded on the conclusion in Llanusa that the trial court lacks jurisdiction to try a defendant after the expiration of the default period.