Is a Statute Overbroad If In Its Reach It Prohibits Constitutionally Protected Conduct ?
A statute is overbroad "if in its reach it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct." State v. T.B.D., 656 So. 2d 479, 481 (Fla. 1995))(quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222, 92 S. Ct. 2294 (1972)).
As this Court has recognized, the overbreadth doctrine "has been employed by the [United States Supreme] Court sparingly and only as a last resort." Id. (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613, 37 L. Ed. 2d 830, 93 S. Ct. 2908 (1973)).
In T.B. D., the court further quoted Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615, in explaining the proper application of the doctrine:
The plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from "pure speech" toward conduct and that conduct--even if expressive--falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. . . . to put the matter another way, particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. T.B.D., 656 So. 2d at 481-82.