Is Prolonged Stay on Death Row Constitutes Cruel and Unusual Punishment ?
In Marek v. State, the court explained:
With regard to the claim about the length of time Marek has spent on death row, we have previously rejected similar arguments.
In Tompkins, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1085 (Fla. 2008), we held that twenty-three years on death row did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
We explained that "this Court recognized that 'no federal or state court has accepted the argument that a prolonged stay on death row constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, especially where both parties bear responsibility for the long delay.'" Id. (quoting Booker v. State, 969 So. 2d 186, 200 (Fla. 2007)).
In this case, Marek has contributed to the delay of his execution by filing several postconviction motions and habeas petitions.
He has also been a party to several class action proceedings.
As we stated in Tompkins, "He cannot now contend that his punishment has been illegally prolonged because the delay in carrying out his sentence is in large part due to his own actions in challenging his conviction and sentence." Id. Marek, 8 So. 3d at 1131;
Gore v. State, 964 So. 2d 1257, 1276 (Fla. 2007) (holding that twenty-three years served on death row is not cruel and unusual punishment), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1197, 128 S. Ct. 1250, 170 L. Ed. 2d 89 (2008);
Elledge v. State, 911 So. 2d 57, 76 (Fla. 2005) (finding no merit in constitutional claim predicated on the cruel and unusual nature of prolonged stay on death row);
Lucas v. State, 841 So. 2d 380, 389 (Fla. 2003) (concluding that twenty-five years on death row does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment);
Foster v. State, 810 So. 2d 910, 916 (Fla. 2002) (holding that twenty-three years on death row is not cruel and unusual punishment).