Is the Trial Court's Order Dismissing Charges With Prejudice to Be Treated As An Order Dismissing An Information Appealable ?

In State v. Sherrod, 383 So. 2d 752, 753 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), the Fourth District determined that although the trial court's order dismissing charges against a defendant with prejudice resembled a judgment of acquittal, it should be treated as an order dismissing an information, which was appealable by the State pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(A). See Sherrod, 383 So. 2d at 753. Similarly, in State v. Harris, 439 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), the Second District determined that the trial court's order granting the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal was the functional equivalent of an order arresting judgment, which was appealable under rule 9.140(c)(1)(D). 439 So. 2d at 268-69. Unlike Gaines, however, neither Sherrod nor Harris involved double jeopardy concerns because the defendants were not "acquitted" of their respective criminal charges. The trial courts' rulings in Sherrod and Harris were not based on the fact that the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain convictions. See Harris, 439 So. 2d at 269-70; Sherrod, 383 So. 2d at 753-54; see also United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 97, 57 L. Ed. 2d 65, 98 S. Ct. 2187 (1978).