In Larimore v. State, 2 So. 3d 101 (Fla. 2008) after pleading guilty to Act-qualifying offenses in two separate cases, Larimore was sentenced in 1991 to prison for a term of fifteen years in one case to be followed by probation for a term of five years in the other case. Id. at 104. With gain-time awarded, Larimore was released from prison in October 1998, and began serving his probationary term. Id. In February 2000, after violating his probation, the court revoked his probation and sentenced Larimore to five years in prison. Id. In August 2002, the First District held that Larimore was entitled to Tripp v. State credit for the fifteen years served on his original prison sentence--which included prison time served as well as gain-time awarded--effectively erasing his five-year revocation of probation term. Id. In Tripp v. State, 622 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 1993), we held that "if a trial court imposes a term of probation on one offense consecutive to a sentence of incarceration on another offense, credit for time served on the first offense must be awarded on the sentence imposed after revocation of probation on the second offense." Id. at 942 The DOC thereafter forfeited 2,830 days of gain-time which Larimore had earned on his original prison sentence. Id. In November 2004, the State filed a commitment petition against Larimore pursuant to the Act. Id. The following month, the First District held that Larimore was entitled to an immediate release because the forfeiture of gain-time was not authorized. Id. Larimore moved to dismiss the commitment petition, claiming that he was not in lawful custody on the effective date of the Act. Id. After the circuit court denied the motion, Larimore then filed a petition for writ of prohibition with the First District. Id. The district court found that Larimore was not in lawful custody when the state filed its commitment petition in November 2004. Id. at 104-05. However, the district court concluded that the circuit court had jurisdiction over the commitment petition because "jurisdiction under the amended Act is not conditioned on a person being 'in custody' on the date the petition is filed." Id. at 104. Accordingly, the First District denied Larimore's petition for writ of prohibition, and certified conflict with the Second District's decision in Gordon v. Regier, 839 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Larimore, 2 So. 3d at 104-05. In Larimore, the Court clearly held that lawful custody is required whether the State is initiating commitment proceedings pursuant to section 394.913 or 394.9135 of the Act: As to the question of custody, we conclude that it is clear from a reading of all of the related provisions that the legislative intent of the Jimmy Ryce Act is that the person is in lawful custody at the time any initial steps are taken in the commitment process under either section 394.913 or 394.9135. . . . Because the Jimmy Ryce Act, by its express terms, is founded upon the concept that the individual be in lawful custody when any portion of the commitment proceedings is initiated, and because of the due process considerations . . . we conclude that the Act requires that the individual be in lawful custody when commitment proceedings are initiated. (Id. at 110-11, 117.) Lawful custody is required "in order for the circuit court to have jurisdiction to adjudicate the commitment petition." Id. at 117. The Court explained that if the judge finds that there is probable cause to believe an individual is a sexually violent predator pursuant to section 394.9135, then "the judge shall order the person be maintained in custody and held in an appropriate secure facility for further proceedings in accordance with this part." Id. at 109. Therefore, "section 394.9135 is predicated on the underlying premise that the individual is in custody when initial steps are taken in the commitment process, addressing what must happen when 'the anticipated release from total confinement of a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense becomes immediate for any reason.'" Id. (quoting 394.9135(1), Fla. Stat. (2004)). In addition, we found that the jurisdictional disclaimer provision in section 394.9135(4) "should not be extended beyond its actual text to dispense with the custody requirement where no steps in the proceedings have been initiated." Id. at 113. The Court also determined that the plurality Court's decision in Tanguay v. State, 880 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 2004)--which held that the circuit court was not divested of jurisdiction to adjudicate the commitment petition even though the individual was not in lawful custody when the petition was filed--did not control our construction of the Act. Id. at 114. The Court explained that the language "taken into custody" under section 916.35(1), the statute in effect in Tanguay, did not appear in the current version of sections 394.915 or 394.9135. Id. Instead, if the judge finds that probable cause exists, under section 394.915, the judge shall order that the individual "remain in custody." Id. With "remain in custody" replacing "taken into custody" coupled with the Legislature's enactment of section 394.9135, "providing for special procedures where immediate release is anticipated," we held that "there is no longer any statutory basis on which to hold that there is no 'in custody' requirement in the Jimmy Ryce Act." Id. at 115. Accordingly, we ordered the dismissal of the State's commitment petition with prejudice "because Larimore was not in legal custody when initial steps were taken to initiate civil commitment proceedings against him." Id. at 117.