In Melvin v. State, 677 So. 2d 1317 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), the defendant's van turned in front of the victim's oncoming vehicle, causing a collision. 677 So. 2d at 1317. The victim eventually died from injuries sustained in the collision. Evidence adduced at trial showed that Melvin was intoxicated at the time of the car accident. Melvin requested a modified jury instruction based on his interpretation of Magaw v. State, 537 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 1989). The trial court denied the requested instruction. Melvin was subsequently convicted of DUI manslaughter. The Fourth District affirmed the conviction on appeal, reasoning as follows: Magaw v. State, has been interpreted as recognizing that for DUI manslaughter, the state must prove that the defendant was negligent and that this negligence was a contributing cause of the death. See Foster v. State, 603 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), rev. denied, 613 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1993); Parker v. State, 590 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), rev. denied, 599 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 1992). In Murphy v. State, 578 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), disapproved on other grounds, State v. Chapman, 625 So. 2d 838 (Fla.1993), the Court recognized, distinguishing DUI manslaughter from vehicular homicide, that DUI manslaughter "requires proof of simple negligence while operating an automobile under the influence of alcohol." 578 So. 2d at 411, citing Magaw. We, nevertheless, find no error in the court's denial of the requested instruction. The standard jury instruction for DUI manslaughter requires a finding that by reason of operation of the vehicle, Melvin caused or contributed to the victim's death. Explicit in this instruction is a determination by the jury of causation--Melvin had to cause the death by reason of his operation of his vehicle. Although in Magaw the court elaborated on the meaning of the term "caused," we do not construe that opinion as requiring that the standard instruction be broadened to specify lack of care as a distinct element. For example, based on the standard instruction, if the jury concluded that someone else had caused the death, perhaps another driver, Melvin would be found not guilty. Similarly, if the death was the result of factors beyond Melvin's control, he would be not guilty. Either of these scenarios, not involved here, would preclude a finding of causation and result in a defendant's acquittal as a defendant may be convicted only on proof of causation. We have considered Melvin's argument in reliance on the First District's decision in Foster, 603 So. 2d at 1312. However, in Foster, the court did not hold the DUI manslaughter instruction to be per se misleading, nor did it mandate the use of an alternative instruction. (Melvin, 677 So. 2d at 1318.)