In Munoz v. State, 937 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006), the Second District determined that the burglarized house was "not a dwelling by any stretch of the imagination" where the house had been "gutted" and was being "reworked from the ground up." 937 So. 2d at 687, 689. The court described the house as a "construction site" as the electricity was temporary and "for construction purposes only" and the indoor plumbing was not in use. Id. at 687. The house had wires hanging from the ceiling, unfinished flooring and "a piece of plywood" acting as the back door. Id. The Second District held that a house which had been "gutted" so that it could be restored and sold no longer qualified as a "dwelling." The Second District reasoned that the legislature specifically protected houses made unsuitable for lodging during emergencies, and did not provide that same protection for houses unsuitable for lodging for other reasons, such as reconstruction or renovations. Id. at 689. The court also concluded that the state of emergency exception only made sense in relation to Perkins v. State, 682 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 1996) if a structure is required to be both designed for lodging by people and suitable for lodging by people in order to qualify as a dwelling. Id. Accordingly, the Second District determined that the "massive reconstruction" taking place in the house made it unsuitable for lodging, and therefore, it was not a dwelling. Id. at 689. In Munoz, the Second District departed from its previous decision in State v. Bennett, 565 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), where it concluded that "as long as a structure is ' 'designed' for eventual human habitation,' it qualifies as a dwelling." Munoz v. State, 937 So. 2d at 688. The dissent in Munoz asserted that the Munoz majority misread Perkins. Id. at 690 (Canady, J., dissenting). The dissent contended that the rationale employed in Bennett should have controlled the decision, as the Bennett rationale can be read in accordance with this Court's decision in Perkins. Id. The dissent argued that "the designed use of a structure denotes the purpose for which the structure is eventually intended to be used" and that this designed use "is not changed by transitory circumstances--such as a major renovation project--that render the premises temporarily uninhabitable." Id. As to this Court's requirement in Perkins that the character of the structure not be substantially modified to the extent that it becomes unsuitable for lodging, the dissent explained that this requirement prohibits the purpose for which the structure is designed from being altered, such as when a residential structure is converted to a commercial or other non-residential use. Id. at 691 (citing Perkins, 682 So. 2d at 1084). The dissent further opined that the state of emergency exception to the statute is necessary to ensure that a house that collapses or loses its roof during a state of emergency remains within the definition of a dwelling, despite the fact that it may no longer be considered a building. Id. at 692. The dissent contended that this exception also ensures that dwellings damaged during a state of emergency do not lose the protection of the penalties for burglary of a dwelling; this is evidenced by the history of the burglary statute which demonstrates legislative purpose to expand the coverage of the statute, not to restrict it as done by the majority in Munoz. Id.