Rule 3.850 Provides a Time Period After Which Petitions May Not Be Filed
In Cave v. State, 529 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1988), the court stated:
Appellant presents one additional point.
Under rule 3.850, appellant's conviction and sentence became final in early June 1986, when the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review of Cave, our affirmance on direct appeal. Burr v. State, 518 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1987).
Rule 3.850 prescribes a two-year period following final conviction for filing petitions for post-conviction relief, after which such petitions are procedurally barred.
The Governor signed a death warrant on appellant on April 27, 1988, providing for execution during the week of July 6, 1988.
Under these circumstances, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 requires that any post-conviction petitions be filed within thirty days of the signing of the warrant.
Appellant filed his petition on May 27, 1988, which, he now claims, shortened by thirteen days his asserted right to a two-year period under rule 3.850.
Essentially, appellant is claiming that procedural rule 3.850 prohibits the Governor of Florida from signing a death warrant until two years after a death sentence becomes final.
This issue was not presented below and is procedurally barred.
Moreover, this Court has no constitutional authority to abrogate the Governor's authority to issue death warrants on death sentenced prisoners whose convictions are final.
Unless there is a petition for post-conviction relief, the affirmance of a final conviction ends the role of the courts.
Rule 3.850 merely provides a time period after which petitions may not be filed. It does not act as a bar to execution of sentences immediately after they become final. Cave, 529 So. 2d at 298-99.