In Szteinbaum v. Kaes Inversiones Y Valores, C.A., 476 So. 2d 247 (Fla. App. 1985), the court considered "whether a complaint filed by a non-attorney on behalf of a corporation may be amended to cure this deficiency." Id. The trial court initially dismissed the complaint, without prejudice, because the corporate plaintiff was not represented by a lawyer. Although an amended complaint was filed by an attorney, the defendant moved again to dismiss, arguing that the first complaint was a nullity. When that motion was denied, the defendant appealed. On appeal, the court said that "there can be little doubt that the act of filing a complaint constitutes the practice of law...." 476 So. 2d at 248. Nevertheless, it recognized that "courts have reflexively applied" the rules barring the unauthorized practice of law. Id. It noted, too, that the record did not reflect that the corporation had "proceeded with knowledge of the impropriety of its actions," 476 So. 2d at 251, or that the defendant had actually been prejudiced by what occurred. 476 So. 2d at 252. The court concluded that the corporation's initial failure to act through counsel was cured when the amended complaint was filed by an attorney. Szteinbaum, 476 So. 2d at 250. In reaching that result, the Court reasoned: Public policy dictates that, whenever possible, cases 'should be determined on their merits, instead of upon irrelevant technicalities.' Thus, dismissal of the amended complaint in the present case in derogation of this 'welcome policy' is warranted only if it can be said that treating the defect of the initial complaint as incurable will somehow substantially advance some other more compelling public policy. To be sure, the 'protection of the public from incompetent, unethical, or irresponsible representation' through the prevention of the unauthorized practice of law is a compelling public policy. We suggest, however, that this latter policy is not served by a rule of law that declares that a complaint filed by a non-attorney on behalf of a corporation cannot be cured by the later appearance of counsel to represent the corporation and, moreover, that such a rule of law disserves the policy that cases should be decided on their merits. Where, as here, the representation of the plaintiff corporation, confined as it was to the filing of the complaint, was brief, minimal and essentially innocuous, the unauthorized practice of law was adequately curtailed by the trial judge's eminently sensible decision to allow an attorney to appear for the corporation and thereby amend the complaint.... Indeed, prohibiting amendment and dismissing as a nullity the complaint would yield the ironic result of prejudicing the constituents of the corporation, the very people sought to be protected by the rule against the unauthorized practice of law. ... In short, only unquestioning adherence to the rigid mechanistic rule . . . would require the draconian measure of nullifying a complaint filed by a non-attorney on behalf of a corporation. ... We therefore conclude that the defect of the complaint herein was curable and indeed cured by the later appearance in the action of the plaintiff corporation's attorney. The draconian sanction of dismissal without leave to amend is unduly harsh in light of the prejudice to the unwary corporate constituents and the total lack of prejudice to the defendant. (476 So. 2d at 249-52.)