In Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 499, 502 (Fla. 1989), the Court outlined a two-step inquiry to determine whether long-arm jurisdiction extends over a nonresident defendant. First, a court must determine whether sufficient jurisdictional facts are alleged to bring the action within the ambit of Florida's long-arm statute. See id. If the first step of the inquiry is satisfied, a court must then determine whether the defendant has sufficient "minimum contacts" with the state to satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment's due-process requirements. See id. To satisfy such constitutional requirements, a court must determine that "the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum state are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S. Ct. 559, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1980). The first step of the Venetian Salami analysis may involve a burden shift. First, the plaintiff must plead the basis for personal jurisdiction pursuant to the applicable long-arm statute--here, section 48.193. See Venetian Salami, 554 So. 2d at 502. If the plaintiff satisfies this requirement, a defendant who wishes to challenge personal jurisdiction must provide admissible evidence that refutes the essential jurisdictional facts set forth in the plaintiff's complaint. See id. If a defendant fully refutes the jurisdictional allegations, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove the basis for jurisdiction. See id. Florida's long-arm statute, in relevant part, states: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or herself . . . to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from the doing of any of the following acts: (a) Operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in this state or having an office or agency in this state. (b) Committing a tortious act within this state. . . . . (f) Causing injury to persons or property within this state arising out of an act or omission by the defendant outside this state, if, at or about the time of the injury, either: The defendant was engaged in solicitation or service activities within this state; or Products, materials, or things processed, serviced, or manufactured by the defendant anywhere were used or consumed within this state in the ordinary course of commerce, trade, or use. 48.193(1), Fla. Stat. (2011)