In Ghrist v. Fricks, 219 Ga. App. 415, 465 S.E.2d 501 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995), wife and her husband had a son born during the marriage. The husband was listed as the father on the son's birth certificate. The husband related to the son as a father does, and a father-and-son bond developed between them. Unbeknownst to the husband, however, his wife had been carrying on an affair with an alleged father beginning a few months into the marriage and continuing through and after the period of her son's conception. The wife first suspected that the alleged father was the natural father of her son shortly after discovering she was pregnant. 465 S.E.2d at 503, 505. Almost two years after her son's birth, the wife filed for divorce. In her divorce complaint, the wife alleged that her husband was the natural father of her son. About a month later, the wife and the husband entered into a settlement agreement which referred to her son as their minor child and laid out the husband's visitations rights and child support responsibilities. About another month later, the divorce court entered a final judgment and decree of divorce which expressly incorporated the settlement agreement. Id. About three months after the divorce became final, the wife and the alleged father married. Eight months after their marriage, they had blood tests performed which confirmed the alleged father's paternity. They then filed a paternity action to determine the alleged father's paternity, and to relieve the former husband of his child support obligations and divest him of his parental rights. Over the former husband's objection, the trial court ordered him to submit to a blood test, which excluded any possibility that he was the natural father of the son. Id. Following a jury trial, the trial court entered a judgment declaring the alleged father to be the son's legal and biological father, relieving the former husband of his child support obligations and divesting him of his parental rights. Id. at 504. The Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed, holding that the wife and the alleged father were collaterally estopped from bringing the paternity action by the previous divorce judgment and their actions and positions therein. In so holding, the court of appeals remarked that "this court cannot in good conscience permit wife and alleged father to now deny that the former husband is the child's father and to sever all ties the child has with his legal father." Id. at 505.