Benavente v. Taitano

In Benavente v. Taitano, 2006 Guam 15, the Court discussed the relationship between Chapters 12 and 16 in our determination of whether the remedy provided in 3 GCA 12115, that is, to annul or set aside an election, was a remedy available to those who file a primary election contest under Chapter 16. Id. P 37. There, the Court held that "the election contest provisions in Chapters 12 and 16 of Title 3 GCA relate to the same subject matter and are aimed at the same situation. As such, they should be construed together and applied harmoniously and consistently." Id. P 42. The Court recognized in Benavente, that "it is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that courts must look first to the language of the statute itself." Id. P 35. The Court also recognized that "it is a 'rudimentary principle of construction' that 'statutes dealing with similar subjects should be interpreted harmoniously.'" Id. In addition, the Court observed that "laws providing for election contests are liberally construed so that doubtful questions of election will be expeditiously settled," id. at P 36, and that "an election code is to be liberally construed so that candidates are not deprived of their right to office, and voters are not deprived of their vote to elect the candidate of their choice." Id. In Benavente v. Taitano, the respondents moved for dismissal of the petition based on, among other things, the failure to join indispensable parties. The trial court found that nominees on the primary ballot who had not been made parties to the case would have their rights prejudiced if the petitioners received the relief sought: an invalidation of the primary election. Benavente v. Taitano, SP0140-06 (Dec. & Order at 12 (Oct. 5, 2006)). It appears that this issue, including the rights lost, was raised by the respondents and not by the absentee nominees. See id.; Benavente, 2006 Guam 15 8. The Court stated that the focus of GRCP 19(a)(1) "is on the relief between the parties to the present action, and not on the possibility of further litigation between a party and the absentee.". Relying on Public Law 22-080, which amended Public Law 22-073, the trial court determined that "only the Governor is authorized to offer compensation to a landowner who is successful in an inverse condemnation case." RA, tab 55 at 36 (Finds. Fact & Concl. L.). According to the trial court, because the governor has the exclusive power to authorize compensation for a governmental taking, his absence precludes relief to Gutierrez for any taking of Lot 1-2-2. Id. at 38. The Court adopted the three elements of Article III standing articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court: "First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact-an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. . . . Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has to be fairly . . . traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Benavente, 2006 Guam 15 15.