In Doe Parents No. 1 v. State, Dept. of Education (2002) 100 Hawaii 34 58 P.3d 545, the plaintiffs sued the Hawaii Department of Education (Department), alleging that a school teacher, Lawrence Norton, had molested their children and that the Department was liable for negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED). The Department argued that the suit was barred by the State Tort Liability Act (STLA) (Hawaii Rev. Stat. 662-1 et seq.), specifically, the section precluding suits for intentional torts (id., 662-15(4)). The Hawaii Supreme Court disagreed, explaining: "In the present matter, the plaintiffs' negligence and NIED claims are not duplicitous of their respondeat superior claim. Under the latter, the plaintiffs posit that the Department, as Norton's employer, is vicariously liable for his molestation of the girls because Norton's acts of molestation occurred within the scope of his employment with the Department; the conduct of other Department employees, such as Norton's supervisors, is irrelevant to the Department's potential liability under respondeat superior, because the only material question is whether Norton's molestation of the girls constituted a negligent act that was within the scope of his employment. ... It is precisely such a theory of liability that the STLA's intentional tort exception precludes, where the allegedly negligent act of the employee is asserted to be 'assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.' ... In other words, the plaintiffs' respondeat superior claim must 'arise out of' Norton's assault and battery of the girls because his molestation of them is the sole basis of the plaintiffs' claim against his employer, the Department. "On the other hand, the plaintiffs' negligence and NIED claims are not predicated upon Norton's molestation of the girls per se. Rather, the plaintiffs posit that other Department employees ... breached a duty that legally caused the plaintiffs' injuries. The plaintiffs' theory of negligence--predicated, as it is, upon the acts and omissions of Norton's supervisors--does not, therefore, 'arise out of' Norton's molestation of the students. To the contrary, Norton's molestation of the students arises out of his supervisors' antecedent negligent acts and omissions in reinstating and in failing to supervise him. ... "Based on the foregoing discussion, we hold that, where a plaintiff's negligence claim against the State seeks to hold the State vicariously liable for a state employee's ?assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights' under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the State is, pursuant to the STLA immune from the plaintiff's claim. However, where the plaintiff's negligence claim seeks to hold the State liable for the conduct of state employees other than the alleged intentional tortfeasor, pursuant to theories of negligent hiring, retention, supervision, or the like, the plaintiff's claim does not necessarily 'arise out of' the hired, retained, or supervised employee's intentional tort. Rather, if the State knew, or reasonably should have anticipated, that one of its employees would commit an intentional tort against a person to whom the State owed a duty of care, the State is liable for the negligence of those employees who were in a position to take reasonable precautions against the anticipated harm. "In light of the foregoing, we further hold, to the extent that the plaintiffs predicate their negligence and NIED claims upon the Department's negligent retention and supervision of Norton, that the STLA's intentional tort exception does not insulate the Department from liability; given that the plaintiffs have alleged that the Department reasonably should have anticipated that Norton would molest the girls, their negligent retention and supervision claims do not 'arise out of' Norton's acts of molestation." (Doe Parents No. 1 v. State, Dept. of Education, supra, 58 P.3d at pp. 578-579, fns. & ) In discussing the legal basis of the plaintiffs' claims, the Hawaii Supreme Court stated: ?We hold that the duty of care that the Department owes to students and their parents is, on a general level, a duty to take whatever precautions are necessary reasonably to ensure the safety and welfare of the children entrusted to its custody and control against harms that the Department anticipates, or reasonably should anticipate. Although we have not expressly said so in the past, it is readily apparent that the foregoing duty arises from the 'special relationship' that the Department shares with its students and their parents ... . Thus, whether the Department's duty is characterized as one of 'reasonable supervision of its students,' ... or as a 'special' duty, 'in loco parentis,' to exercise reasonable care to protect a student from foreseeable harm, ... does not alter what the Department's duty quintessentially entails--to exercise reasonable care in ensuring that students are educated in a safe environment free from any unreasonable risks of harm. ... The Department's duty stems from its custodial relationship, in loco parentis, with students and, thus, obligates the Department reasonably to anticipate, as would a reasonably prudent parent, foreseeable harm and to take whatever action is reasonable to protect a student from that foreseeable harm." (Doe Parents No. 1 v. State, Dept. of Education, supra, 58 P.3d at pp. 591-592.)