In Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969), the Hawai'i Supreme Court first applied the theory of implied warranty of habitability and fitness for the use intended. The supreme court stated, in relevant part, as follows: At common law when land was leased to a tenant, the law of property regarded the lease as equivalent to a sale of the premises for a term. The lessee acquired an estate in land and became both owner and occupier for the term subject to the ancient doctrine of caveat emptor. Since rules of property law solidified before the development of mutually dependent covenants in contract law, theoretically once an estate was leased, there were no further unexecuted acts to be performed by the landlord and there could be no failure of consideration. . . . Given the finality of a lease transaction and the legal effect of caveat emptor which placed the burden of inspection on the tenant, the actual moment of the conveyance was subject to an untowards amount of legal focus. Only if there were fraud or mistake in the initial transaction would the lessee have a remedy. . . The rule of caveat emptor in lease transactions at one time may have had some basis in social practice as well as in historical doctrine. . . . There was generally equal knowledge of the condition of the land by both landlord and tenant. The land itself would often yield the rents and the buildings were constructed simply, without modern conveniences like wiring or plumbing. Yet in an urban society where the vast majority of tenants do not reap the rent directly from the land but bargain primarily for the right to enjoy the premises for living purposes, often signing standardized leases as in this case, common law conceptions of a lease and the tenant's liability for rent are no longer viable. In Lemle, the plaintiff and his family camped in the living room and were without sleep due to natural apprehension of the rats which made noise scurrying about on the roof and invaded the house through the unscreened openings. Id. at 434, 426 P.2d at 474. The Court ultimately decided that the landlord cannot enforce the lease when the facts demonstrate the uninhabitability and unfitness of the premises for residential purposes.