With respect to motions to suppress evidence recovered at police searches, Professor Wright says: If a motion to suppress is denied, this becomes the law of the case and the illegality of the search cannot ordinarily be relitigated by objection to the evidence at the trial. But the preliminary denial cannot be binding in all circumstances. The ruling on the motion is an interlocutory one, and if new facts come to light at the trial, the court is free to reconsider the legality of the search on objection to the evidence. . . .C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d 676 (1982). In other words, when the defendant's pretrial motion to suppress is denied and the evidence is subsequently introduced at trial, the defendant's appeal of the denial of the motion to suppress is actually an appeal of the introduction of the evidence at trial. Consequently, when deciding an appeal of the pretrial denial of the defendant's motion to suppress, the appellate court considers both the record of the hearing on the motion to suppress and the record of the trial. State v. Nakachi, 7 Haw. App. 28, 33 n.7, 742 P.2d 388, 392 n. 7 (1987); State v. Uddipa, 3 Haw. App. 415, 416-17, 651 P.2d 507, 509 (1982); State v. Crowder, 1 Haw. App. 60, 66-67, 613 P.2d 909, 914 (1980). State v. Kong, 77 Haw. 264, 266, 883 P.2d 686, 688 (App. 1994).