X and X were married and separated. Pursuant to a separation agreement, X was given primary custody of the parties' two minor children. X filed for divorce. All issues relating to the divorce were resolved except the issue of child support. A trial was held, and the magistrate ordered X to pay child support in the amount of $ 1,019.50 per month. X filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the magistrate. X filed a motion for attorney fees pursuant to I.C. 32-704(3), which was granted. X appealed to the district court, which determined that the magistrate had erred in calculating a portion of X's income. The district court, therefore, remanded the case to the magistrate for reconsideration of the award of child support and attorney fees. the district court's order was not appealed. on remand, the magistrate ordered a new trial. 1 1 Thereafter, in the magistrate's division of the district court, Judge McDaniel was recused, and Judge Comstock was appointed to preside over the case. Before a new trial was held, X and X entered into a stipulation establishing X's monthly gross income at $ 5,285 and X's monthly gross income at $ 2,155. the stipulation also provided that X and X were each to have primary custody of one of their children. Lastly, the stipulation provided that the parties were to "submit the remaining issue of attorneys fees on remand to the court upon argument on the record." Based upon the stipulation, the magistrate ordered X to pay child support in the amount of $ 397 per month. X then filed a motion for attorney fees pursuant to J.C. 32-704(3), which was granted by the magistrate in the amount of $ 10,460. X filed a second motion for attorney fees and costs pursuant to I.C. 32-704(3) for her defense of X's appeal to the district court. The magistrate granted X's second motion in the amount of $ 5,753.16. X appealed to the district court, which affirmed both of the magistrate's awards. X again appeals. A. First Attorney Fees Award On appeal, X argues that the magistrate abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees to X in the amount of $ 10,460. A review of the magistrate's order reveals that its decision to award attorney fees to X was guided by I.C. 32-704(3) and I.C. 32-705. the magistrate's order also reveals that the magistrate fully considered the financial resources of both parties before making its decision. The magistrate found that a substantial disparity existed between the incomes of X and X, that X was incapable of paying her own attorney fees, and that X could afford to pay those fees for her. On appeal, X contends that these findings are not supported by substantial and competent evidence. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury, findings of fact are not set aside on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a). Thus, the task of this Court, when reviewing factual findings, is not to weigh the evidence nor to substitute its own view of the facts for that of the trial judge. Ficarro v. McCoy, 126 Idaho 122, 125, 879 P.2d 30, 33 (Ct. App. 1994). This Court's task is to determine whether the factual findings are supported by substantial, albeit conflicting, evidence in the record. Id. If so, the findings cannot be said to be clearly erroneous. Id; Rasmussen v. Martin, 104 Idaho 401, 404, 659 P.2d 155, 158 (Ct. App. 1983). We regard evidence as substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been proven. Ficarro, 126 Idaho at 125, 879 P.2d at 33. First, the magistrate found that a "substantial disparity existed regarding the parties' incomes." the parties stipulated that X's monthly gross income was $ 5,285 and that X's monthly gross income was $ 2,155. at trial, spreadsheets were admitted that showed that X's monthly expenses were approximately $ 3,162 and that X's monthly expenses were approximately $ 3,383. After accounting for each parties' monthly expenses and for the payment of child support, the record reveals that that X had no monthly income in excess of expenses and that X's monthly income exceeding expenses totaled approximately $ 1,700. X was, therefore, capable of saving a portion of his disposable income, while X could not afford to pay her own reasonable expenses. Consequently, the magistrate's finding that the disparity was substantial is supported by the evidence. Second, the magistrate reviewed the record and agreed with the prior magistrate's determination that "X was unable to meet her reasonable needs, including attorney fees, based upon her income." As shown above, X's stipulated monthly gross income was insufficient to meet her monthly expenses. Furthermore, X testified at trial that she could not afford to pay her attorney fees and did not have any savings. Thus, the magistrate's finding that X was incapable of paying her attorney fees is supported by substantial and competent evidence. Lastly, the magistrate reviewed the record and agreed with the prior magistrate's determination that X had "substantial assets available to him to use for the payment of attorney fees." As shown above, X's yearly disposable income is approximately $ 20,400. X also testified at trial that he- had received a $ 10,000 federal income tax refund. In addition, X owns an interest in two ranching operations valued at over $ 600,000. 2 Although X and seven other individuals jointly and severally owe approximately $ 568,000 in taxes relating to the inheritance of the ranch property, there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's finding that X had significant assets available to pay X's attorney fees. 2 This value is based upon X's testimony regarding the number of acres in which he owns an interest and the property's value. X testified that he owned an undivided 1/4 interest in 45,439.18 acres; an undivided 1/3 interest in 8,008.83 acres; an undivided 1/5 interest in 160 acres; and 100 percent of 639 acres. When asked what his property was worth, X replied that it was "worth about forty-one dollars ($ 41) an acre" based upon an adjustment for his undivided interest in the property. The magistrate found that a substantial disparity existed between the incomes of X and X, that X was incapable of paying her own attorney fees, and that X could afford to pay those fees for her. These findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence contained in the record. Based upon these findings, we hold that the magistrate did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees, pursuant to I.C. 32-704(3), to X in the amount of $ 10,460. B. Second Attorney Fees Award On appeal, X argues that the magistrate abused its discretion by awarding attorney fees, pursuant to I.C. 32-704(3), to X in the amount of $ 5,753.16 for her defense of the appeal to the district court. X contends that the magistrate erroneously awarded the fees because X had requested attorney fees in her brief on appeal to the district court and the district court did not address her request in its order remanding the case to the magistrate. Therefore, it was within the magistrate's discretion to award attorney fees to X for her defense of X's appeal to the district court. Next, X argues that the magistrate abused its discretion by relying on a two-year-old record in determining whether to grant X's request for attorney fees. However, X entered a stipulation which provided that the magistrate was to decide the issue of attorney fees based upon the record. Thus, the magistrate did not abuse its discretion by relying exclusively upon the record before it. Lastly, X argues that the magistrate abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees without first determining that X was a prevailing party pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1). An award of attorney fees pursuant to I.C. 32-704(2), however, is not dependent upon who prevails. Antill v. Antill, 127 Idaho 954, 958, 908 P.2d 1261, 1265 (Ct. App. 1996). Consequently, X has failed to show that the magistrate abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees, pursuant to I.C. 32-704(3), to X in the amount of $ 5,753.16 for her defense of the appeal to the district court. C. Attorney Fees on Appeal X requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. 12-121 and I.A.R. 41. An award pursuant to I.C. 12-121 is appropriate only if this Court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal has been brought frivolously and without foundation. Chicoine v. Bignall, 127 Idaho 225, 228, 899 P.2d 438, 441 (1995). After having thoroughly reviewed all the issues raised and the arguments presented, this Court cannot conclude that X's appeal was frivolous. Thus, we decline to award attorney fees to X on appeal. CONCLUSION Based upon the foregoing discussion, we affirm the district court's decision upholding the magistrate's award of attorney fees to X in the amount of $ 10,460. We also affirm the district court's decision upholding the magistrate's second award of attorney fees and costs to X in the amount of $ 5,753.16. Costs, but not attorney fees, are awarded on appeal to respondent.